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Abstract
The paper provides a critical appraisal of the normative program of behavioral economics known 
as ‘new paternalism’. First, it explores the theoretical foundations of behavioral economics, describes 
major behavioral anomalies associated with bounded rationality of economic agents and discusses its 
normative principles and political implications. It then discusses the main empirical and conceptual 
drawbacks of new paternalism and provides arguments for the alternative non-welfarist normative tra-
dition based on the idea of freedom.
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I am a family.
Like a spectrum, seven egos live within me,
unbearable, like seven beasts.
And the bluest blows a shepherd’s pipe!
And in the springtime,
I dream that I am the eighth!
$QGUHL9R]QHVHQVN\³$QWLZRUOGVDQG7KH¿IWKDFH´
1. Introduction
The emergence of a new research program called ‘behavioral economics’ is one of the 
PRVWVLJQL¿FDQWHYHQWVLQWKHHYROXWLRQRIPRGHUQHFRQRPLFWKHRU\LQUHFHQWSDVWGHFDGHV
7KH SURJUDP DVVHUWHG LWVHOI LQ WKH V DV DQ LQGHSHQGHQW VXEGLVFLSOLQH ERUQ RQ WKH
crossroads of economics and psychology. From the very beginning, behavioral economics 
has challenged the standard (neoclassical) economic theory. From a methodological point 
of view, its main distinctive feature is the wide application of experimental methods (pre-
GRPLQDQWO\LQODERUDWRU\VHWWLQJVDQGWRDPXFKOHVVHUGHJUHHLQWKH¿HOG)URPWKHSRLQW
5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFV±
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of view of positive analysis, its most important message is the rejection of the commonly 
 accepted model of rational choice that has traditionally provided the behavioral foundation 
for the greater part of contemporary economic theory. Numerous experiments performed 
by behavio ral economists have demonstrated that real human behavior shares little with 
QHRFODVVLFDO WKHRU\¶VPDLQ SURWDJRQLVW WKH K\SHUUDWLRQDO +RPR RHFRQRPLFXV ZKR SRV-
sesses a well-ordered set of preferences , perfect information and unlimited computational 
capacities. In the vast variety of situations, the behavior of real economic agents turns out 
to be boundedly rational in the best-case scenarios and clearly irrational in the worst-case 
scenarios.
The ideas and approaches offered by behavioral economics relatively quickly got academic 
recognition, penetrating the mainstream economic theory and leading to a radical transfor-
mation in many of its research domains. Today, an overwhelming majority of economists 
accept these ideas and approaches at least on the general conceptual level, if not in their 
actual research practices. The obvious success of behavioral economics is easily evidenced 
E\DSDUWLDOOLVWRI¿HOGVLWKDVH[SDQGHGLQWRFRQVXPHUFKRLFHWKHRU\¿QDQFHWKHRU\ODZ
and economics, macroeconomics, development economics, game theory, and many others.
Behavioral economists went beyond positive analysis and soon proceeded to develop 
norma tive recommendations for the government (and other major players, such as corpo-
rations or political parties). The normative program built upon the ideas of behavioral 
economics has been dubbed the ‘new’ paternalism. It considerably expanded the boundaries 
RI MXVWL¿DEOH VWDWH LQWHUYHQWLRQ LQ WKH HFRQRP\ DQG LQGLYLGXDO OLYHV FRPSDUHGZLWKZKDW
traditional neoclassical economics was willing to accept. In a popular form, this program 
was presented in the best seller by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving 
Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness 7KDOHUDQG6XQVWHLQ7KHNH\FRQFHSW
of the book, with the term itself (nudge) appearing in its title, was almost immediately taken 
up by economists, lawyers and psychologists, and has since been used to denominate both 
behavioral economics itself and the normative approach to governmental regulation derived 
from it. The idea of this manifesto directed at the public is quite simple: ‘We [the ‘new’ 
SDWHUQDOLVWV@NQRZKRZWRPDNH\RXUOLIHKDSSLHU¶/HRQDUG
The ideas of behavioral economics proved to be extremely attractive for politicians in 
many countries across various parts of the ideological spectrum. Barack Obama used them 
extensively in his election campaigns and has often referred to them during his presidency . 
Time PDJD]LQH FDOOHG WKH JURXS RI KLV PRVW WUXVWHG DGYLVRUV DµEHKDYLRUDO GUHDP WHDP¶
aiming to transform the country with the help of implications drawn from behavioral research 
*UXQZDOG7KHSULPHPLQLVWHURIWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP'DYLG&DPHURQKDVDOVREHHQ
TXLWHLQWHUHVWHGLQWKHLGHDVRIWKHQHZEHKDYLRUDOVFLHQFH+HVHWXSWKH%HKDYLRUDO,QVLJKWV
Team, a special unit to develop behavioral policies, and invited Richard Thaler, the guru of 
behavioral economics, as an informal advisor (Wintour, 2010). In Cameron’s opini on, the 
EHKDYLRUDOQXGJHSROLF\LVDSHUIHFWPHFKDQLVPµWRSHUVXDGHFLWL]HQVWRFKRRVHZKDWLVEHVW
for themselves and society’ (Basham, 2010).
The purpose of our analysis is to provide a critical evaluation of the normative attitude of 
EHKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLFVLWVSRVLWLYHUHVHDUFKSURJUDPLVRQO\GLVFXVVHGWRWKHH[WHQWQHFHVVDU\
to understand the details of the ‘nudge’ policy. In our opinion, the gradual transformation of 
a ‘welfare state’ into a ‘paternalistic state’ is one of the vital but poorly comprehended trends 
in the evolution of the modern government regulation system. This new trend, stemming 
from the ideas of behavioral economics, deserves closer attention.
2. General characteristics
Behavioral economics, which emerged from a symbiosis of economics and psychology, 
may be considered another example of a powerful methodological trend in the cross-discipli-
nary social studies known as ‘economic imperialism.’ That phrase implies invasion of the 
5.DSHOLXVKQLNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
PHWKRGVDQGFRQFHSWVRIHFRQRPLFVFLHQFHLQWRDGMDFHQWVRFLDOGLVFLSOLQHV7KLVµFRORQL]D-
tion’ has already swept through (with mixed results) political theory, sociology, history, law, 
anthropology, criminology, theology and demography. The word imperialism, used meta-
phorically, points directly to the inequality of parties engaging in a relationship. The advo-
FDWHVRIµHFRQRPLFLPSHULDOLVP¶*%HFNHU-+LUVKOHLIHU(/D]HDUDQGRWKHUVDGPLWWKDW
other social disciplines do have valuable observations, concepts and analytical tools at their 
disposal, but claim that only economic science is able to provide a general conceptual frame-
work for understanding various social phenomena.
+RZHYHUEHKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLFVLQYROYHVDGLIIHUHQWW\SHRILQWHUGLVFLSOLQDU\FROODERUD-
WLRQSV\FKRORJ\DFWVDVWKHµPRWKHUFRXQWU\¶ZKHUHDVHFRQRPLFWKHRU\LVWKHWHUULWRU\EHLQJ
µFRORQL]HG¶*ODHVHU0RUHVSHFL¿FDOO\HFRQRPLFSKHQRPHQDDUHDQDO\]HGZLWKWKH
help of concepts and methods developed in psychology. Such an inversion is quite unusual 
IRUPRGHUQHFRQRPLFVZLWKLWVµLPSHULDO¶DPELWLRQV$V$$OFKLDQRQFHLQVLJKWIXOO\VWDWHG
µLWLVQRWHFRQRPLFVFLHQFHWKDWLVLPSHULDOLVWLFLWLVWKHPRGHORIKXPDQEHKDYLRUXQGHUO\-
LQJ LW¶ TXRWH IURP5DGQLW]N\DQG%HUQKROW]+RZHYHU WRGHPRQVWUDWH WKHHPSLUL-
cal inconsistency of this model is precisely the grand purpose of behavioral economists! 
Naturally, in this case, interdisciplinary synthesis can no longer be based on the assumptions 
on human behavior provided by conventional (neoclassical) economic theory.
$QRWKHUGLI¿FXOW\DULVHVKHUH7KHLQWHUGLVFLSOLQDU\VLWXDWLRQVSUHYDOHQWLQPRGHUQHFR-
QRPLFVDQGLQPRGHUQSV\FKRORJ\GLIIHUUDGLFDOO\$VLQJOHSDUDGLJPKDVSUHGRPLQDWHGLQ
economics for a long time, that is, one theoretical approach (neoclassical) has been the main-
stream. By contrast, psychology has multiple paradigms without any one school prevailing as 
the mainstream. The multitude of competing research programs naturally leads to a question: 
which one has been the main supplier of the methods and concepts ‘imported’ by behavioral 
economics?
The presence of the word ‘behavioral’ seemingly points to ‘classical’ behaviorism, a lead-
LQJVFKRRORIWKFHQWXU\SV\FKRORJ\WKDWLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHQDPHRI-:DWVRQ+RZHYHU
DFORVHU H[DPLQDWLRQ SURYHV VXFK DUHIHUHQFH WR EH LQFRUUHFW $QJQHU DQG /RHZHQVWHLQ
%HKDYLRULVPDVVXPHVWKDWRQO\REVHUYHGREMHFWLYHO\PHDVXUDEOHEHKDYLRUFDQVHUYH
as the subject matter for psychology. Behaviorists consider it unacceptable for true science 
to refer to any psychic phenomena (notions, wishes, intentions or plans) that are not actually 
observed. Behavioral economics’ methodology is directly the opposite. Its main objective is 
to study the effect of various mental — and, therefore, not actually observable — inner states 
H[SHULHQFHGE\LQGLYLGXDOVDVSDUWRIWKHLUGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ7KLVSRLQWVWRLWVFORVHDI¿QLW\
with cognitive psychology, developed in direct opposition to ‘classical’ behaviorism. This is 
why many view the adjective ‘behavioral’ as a misnomer and argue instead that ‘cognitive 
HFRQRPLFV¶ZRXOGKDYHEHHQDPXFKFORVHU¿W/DPEHUW3
It is important to distinguish behavioral economics from another research program asso-
ciated with experimental economics$OWKRXJK WKH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WKHP LV QRW IXOO\
clear (depending on the nature of the issue in question, one and the same author may act 
DOWHUQDWLYHO\DVDEHKDYLRUDORUDQH[SHULPHQWDOHFRQRPLVW LWQRQHWKHOHVVH[LVWVDW OHDVW
EHKDYLRUDOWKHRULVWVWKHPVHOYHVLQVLVWRQLWVH[LVWHQFH7YHUVN\DQG.DKQHPDQ7KHVH
approaches undoubtedly have a great deal in common. Both address decision-making pro-
cesses, both use experimental methods, and both place the most value on laboratory research 
UHVXOWV+RZHYHUZKHUHDVEHKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLFVLVIRFXVHGRQLQGLYLGXDOEHKDYLRUH[SHUL-
mental economics is more concerned with the results of interpersonal interaction. The former 
is more interested in the cognitive and behavioral constraints on rationality as such, whereas 
the latter strives to understand how it is possible to overcome these limitations by draw-
ing on various institutional mechanisms (different sets of ‘rules of the game’). The tension 
EHWZHHQ WKHVHGLVFLSOLQHV UHVXOWHG LQ WKH1REHO3UL]HEHLQJDZDUGHG WRSURPLQHQW¿JXUHV
LQERWKEHKDYLRUDODQGH[SHULPHQWDOHFRQRPLFVLQ²SV\FKRORJLVW'.DKQHPDQDQG
HFRQRPLVW96PLWK
 5.DSHOLXVKQLNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
The predecessor to the ‘new’ behavioral economics is the ‘old’ behavioral economics of 
WKHVDQGVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKLGHDVRI+6LPRQDQG-.DWRQD6HQW3
Simon coined the term ‘bounded rationality’, which denotes the entire spectrum of con-
straints on human knowledge and computational capabilities that prevent people in the real 
ZRUOG IURPEHKDYLQJ DV SUHGLFWHG E\ QHRFODVVLFDO WKHRU\ 6LPRQ .DWRQD DSSHDUV
WRKDYHEHHQWKH¿UVWZKRVWDUWHG WRXVH WKH WHUPµEHKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLFV¶.DWRQD
Nevertheless, although the ideas of the ‘old’ behavioral economics raised quite a stir (not 
WRPHQWLRQHDUQLQJ6LPRQWKH1REHO3UL]HLQ(FRQRPLFVLQWKH\ZHUHDOPRVWIXOO\
neglected by the overwhelming majority of economists and failed to create any type of a new, 
VSHFL¿FVXEGLVFLSOLQH0RUHVXUSULVLQJO\LQVSLWHRIWKHREYLRXVSDUDOOHOVWKHLGHDVRIWKH
µROG¶EHKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLFVKDYHQRWKDGDQ\VLJQL¿FDQWLQÀXHQFHRQWKHµQHZ¶EHKDYLRUDO
HFRQRPLFV$QJQHUDQG/RHZHQVWHLQ$SDUWIURPWKHWHUPLQRORJLFDOVLPLODULW\µQHZ¶
and ‘old’ behavioral economic theories are hardly related.
The behavioral turn in economic theory is considered to have been triggered by two 
SDSHUVSXEOLVKHGE\'.DKQHPDQDQG$7YHUVN\.DKQHPDQDQG7YHUVN\
7KHSDSHUVFULWLFL]HGWKHµRUWKRGR[¶H[SHFWHGXWLOLW\WKHRU\RIIHULQJDQDOWHUQDWLYHFRQFHSW
for decision making under uncertainty that was called ‘prospect theory’. Of equal importance 
in promoting behavioral ideas was the work of economist Richard Thaler that appeared at the 
same time and provided a great deal of empirical evidence on the ‘suboptimality’ of decisions 
made by economic agents, such as underestimating opportunity costs, the inability to abstract 
IURPVXQNFRVWVDQGLQVXI¿FLHQWVHOIFRQWURO7KDOHU
Thaler, like Kahneman and Tversky, considered his main goal the development of an 
empirical ly adequate theory of choice that would be able to describe actually observed decision- 
making processes. Inspired by their lead, hundreds of economists and psychologists joined 
the exciting process of ‘deconstructing’ the ‘standard’ rational choice model by discovering 
PRUH DQGPRUHKROHV LQ LW5HQRZQHG VFKRODUV VXFK DV*$NHUORI'$ULHO\&&DPHUHU
*/RHZHQVWHLQ'/DLEVRQ72¶'RQRKXH05DELQ.6XQVWHLQ$6KOHLIHUDQGRWKHUVDUH
among champions of behavioral economics. The impact of behavioral economics on the entire 
spectrum of economic research proved to be so profound and multifaceted that some commen-
tators consider it a true revolution in modern economic thought (Costa-Font, 2011).
3. What is wrong with the conventional model of rational choice?
The standard approach accepted in economic theory presupposes perfect rationality of 
HFRQRPLF DJHQWV (FRQRPLVWVPHDQ VHYHUDO WKLQJV ZKHQ UHIHUULQJ WR µSHUIHFW UDWLRQDOLW\¶
&DPHUHU HW DO  3± )LUVW LQGLYLGXDOV KDYH ZHOORUGHUHG SUHIHUHQFHV
(objectives) and aim at fully satisfying them when making decisions. Second, they do not 
PDNHPLVWDNHVDW OHDVWV\VWHPDWLFDOO\ZKHQFDOFXODWLQJ WKHEHQH¿WVDQGFRVWVDVVRFLDWHG
with multiple choices. Third, in uncertain situations, they can make probabilistic estimates of 
potential outcomes using all available information and revise those estimates as soon as new 
GDWDDUULYHV2EYLRXVO\WKH¿UVWSRLQWLVWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQW
The concept of rationality, as understood by modern economic theory, is purely formal . 
It says nothing about the ‘rightness’ of the goals pursued by individuals. In this formal 
sense,rationality is a synonym for a consistency of preferences that are manifested in the 
DFWXDOFKRLFHVPDGHE\DQLQGLYLGXDO$FFRUGLQJWR$UURZµWKHPDMRUPHDQLQJRIUDWLRQDOLW\
LVDFRQGLWLRQRIFRQVLVWHQF\DPRQJFKRLFHVPDGHIURPGLIIHUHQWVHWVRIDOWHUQDWLYHV¶$UURZ
3[LLL&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHUHVWULFWLRQVLPSRVHGE\HFRQRPLFWKHRU\WRFRQVLGHUDSHU-
VRQ¶VEHKDYLRUµUDWLRQDO¶DUHPLQLPDOWKHXQGHUO\LQJSUHIHUHQFHVPD\EHRIDQ\W\SHH[FHSW
WKDWWKH\PD\QRWEHPXWXDOO\H[FOXVLYH2QO\WKLVDSSURDFKPDNHVFRQVLVWHQWO\PD[LPL]-
ing behavior possible. Given a certain order of preferences and a certain set of constraints 
(physical, institutional, informational), individuals choose the best options of those available 
to them.
5.DSHOLXVKQLNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
)URPWKHYLHZSRLQWRIREVHUYHGEHKDYLRU¿UVW WKLV LPSOLHV WKDW LQ LGHQWLFDOVLWXDWLRQV
rational individuals will make identical choices (choose the same options). Second, whatever 
choice they make, they will have no reasons to regret them or take them back (Saint-Paul, 2011). 
Of course, this does not mean that they will behave similarly in any circumstances every 
time. In choosing between an apple and an orange, a rational agent may choose the apple 
WRGD\DQG WKHRUDQJH WRPRUURZ+RZHYHU LI DVNHGZKHWKHU VKH UHJUHWWHGKHUFKRLFH\HV-
WHUGD\VKHZRXOGGHQ\WKLV0RUHRYHUWKHDSSOHVKHWRRN\HVWHUGD\PD\KDYHEHHQZRUP\
DQGVKHZRXOGKDYHFKRVHQWKHRUDQJHKDGVKHNQRZQWKDW+RZHYHULIZHSXWKHUEDFNLQ
yesterday and provided the same limited information that was available to her then, we would 
observe her choose the apple.
The analysis of the formal requirements to be met by choices (and, correspondingly, the 
underlying preferences) to guarantee their consistency is the subject of a vast number of 
VWXGLHVVHH7YHUVN\DQG.DKQHPDQ7KHOLVWVRIWKHVHUHTXLUHPHQWVD[LRPVRIUDWLR-
QDOFKRLFHYDU\IRUGLIIHUHQWDXWKRUVZLWKWZRDSSHDULQJDVWKHPRVWVLJQL¿FDQWLQWHUPVRI
behavioral psychology: transitivity and context-independence (a slightly different term is 
‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’).
The condition of transitivity assumes that if A is preferred over B, and B is preferred 
over C, then A is preferred over C. Therefore, rational agents can make choices when 
SUHVHQWHGQRWRQO\ZLWK LVRODWHGSDLUVRIDOWHUQDWLYHVEXWDOVRZLWKPXOWLSOHRSWLRQV $Q
agent with non-transitive preferences is not capable of this: if she prefers apples to oranges, 
RUDQJHVWREDQDQDVDQGEDQDQDVWRDSSOHVVKHZLOO¿QGKLPVHOIFRQIXVHGLIRIIHUHGDOOWKUHH
at once.)
7KHRWKHUFRQGLWLRQ²FRQWH[WLQGHSHQGHQFH²PDQLIHVWVLQPDQ\VSHFL¿FZD\V,QSDU-
ticular, it assumes that a choice between two options is independent from the order in which 
they are offered. It also assumes that adding a new option to the existing two should not 
LQÀXHQFHWKHFKRLFHXQOHVVWKHWKLUGRSWLRQLVSUHIHUDEOHWRWKHSUHYLRXVWZR*HQHUDOO\XQGHU
conditions of context-independence, decisions made by individuals when offered different 
descriptions of the same problem will remain the same, i.e., the results of their choices do not 
depend on the form of presentation.
From a more general, philosophical point of view, the premise of rational behavior is 
equivalent to an assumption that each economic agent has a single self. Homo oeconomicus, 
as imagined by neoclassical theory, cannot suffer from split personality. Otherwise, there 
would be no consistency or order in her preferences. In other words, she has only one utility 
function (a single set of preferences), just as each person has a single nose or a single stomach 
(Saint-Paul, 2011. P. 20).
7KHQHRFODVVLFDOWKHRU\¿QGVERWKQRUPDWLYHDQGDQDO\WLFDOVLJQL¿FDQFHLQWKHUDWLRQDOLW\
principle and uses it to evaluate alternative states of the world in terms of better or worse, and 
for describing and explaining observed economic phenomena. This principle is the starting 
point for traditional welfare economics, the normative approach of which was called ‘wel-
IDULVW¶6XJGHQ7KLVDSSURDFKLQWHUSUHWVSUHIHUHQFHVDVGDWDZKHUHDVWKHH[WHQWRI
their satisfaction serves as a normative standard in terms of which any individual’s welfare 
is evaluated. In turn, the welfare of a society is understood as an aggregate of the welfare of 
individuals who make up the society.
It is occasionally asserted as self-evident that individuals know their own interests better 
than others do (be it other individuals or the state). Reference is also made to the ‘consumer 
VRYHUHLJQW\¶SULQFLSOHLQRWKHUZRUGVWKHµFRQVXPHULVDOZD\VULJKW¶$PRUHFRQFHSWXDOO\
VRSKLVWLFDWHGDUJXPHQWLVRIIHUHGE\WKHWKHRU\RIUHYHDOHGSUHIHUHQFHVWKHYHU\DFWRIDQ
LQGLYLGXDOFKRRVLQJDJLYHQRSWLRQZKHQVRPHRWKHUVDUHDYDLODEOHSK\VLFDOO\¿QDQFLDOO\RU
informationally)means that it is best for her and is most fully compatible with her preferences 
because otherwise, her observed choice would have been different.
In behavioral economics, all of the components of the standard rational choice model 
(normative and positive) came under frontal assault. First, empirical research showed that, in 
 5.DSHOLXVKQLNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
real life, ‘[d]eviations of actual behavior from the normative model [of rational choice] are 
too widespread to be ignored, too systematic to be dismissed as random error, and too fun-
damental to be accommodated by relaxing the normative system’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 
3
6HFRQGWKHQXPHURXVEHKDYLRUDOµLUUDWLRQDOLWLHV¶WKDWKDYHEHHQLGHQWL¿HGXQGHUPLQHWKH
philosophical foundation of the conventional approach, namely the belief that an individual 
possesses a single decision making center. In cannot be denied that many of the observed 
anomalies result from the co-existence of several incompatible sets of preferences in an 
in dividual’s psyche. In fact, there are multiple selves, each of which, when given the right 
of decision making, makes decisions based on her own limited interests without considering 
WKRVHRI WKHRWKHUV$OWKRXJKHDFKRI WKHVH LQFDUQDWLRQVFDQDFWDVDUDWLRQDOXWLOLW\PD[L-
PL]HUWKHRYHUODSRIWKHLUGHFLVLRQVZLOOLQHYLWDEO\UHVXOWLQLUUDWLRQDOEHKDYLRU
Third, the normative prescriptions of the welfarist approach are being undermined. The 
evidence gathered by behavioral economists demonstrates in many cases that people have 
a poor understanding of their own true interests and often act contrary to them. If consumers 
are capable of acting to their own detriment, the question of why and on what grounds should 
their ‘sovereignty’ be respected arises. Problems occur also with the principle of revealed 
preferences. In this situation, one cannot be certain that the options actually chosen by indivi-
duals would always be the best for them out of all of those available and, consequently, that 
they should have the last say concerning what is good or bad for them. This is why irrational 
preferences cannot be accepted as a normative standard for evaluating welfare, whether of an 
individual or of society as a whole.
4. Catalogue of irrationalities
The most general empirical implication of behavioral economic analysis is that people 
often understand and interpret situations they face in a manner different from that prescribed 
E\WKHUDWLRQDOFKRLFHPRGHO7KHLUGHFLVLRQPDNLQJPD\EHLQÀXHQFHGE\LQIRUPDWLRQKDY-
LQJQRDFWXDOYDOXHWKH\VXIIHUIURPH[FHVVLYHVHOIFRQ¿GHQFHWKH\DUHVORZLQH[HFXWLQJ
WKHLUGHFLVLRQV WKH\DFWPHFKDQLFDOO\ WKH\PDNHPLVWDNHV LQDVVHVVLQJ WKHSUREDELOLW\RI
IXWXUH HYHQWV DQG WKH\ DFW RQ LPSXOVH LQÀXHQFHG E\ TXLFNO\ FKDQJLQJ HPRWLRQDO VWDWHV
Because of the multitude and variety of cognitive and behavioral errors described in behavio-
ral literature, upon reading it, ‘[t]he casual reader might have the impression that the rational 
homo economicus has died a sad death and the economics profession has moved on to recog-
QL]HWKHWUXHLUUDWLRQDOLW\RIKXPDQNLQG¶/HYLQH3
It is very important (and behaviorists insist on this) that behavioral errors by individuals 
EHSUHGLFWDEOH$ULHO\,QVRPHFLUFXPVWDQFHVHYHQFRPSHWHQWDQGVXFFHVVIXOLQGLYL
duals act irrationally, damaging their own long-term interests. Changing the smallest detail in 
DVLWXDWLRQPD\EHVXI¿FLHQWWRDOWHUDSHUVRQ¶VEHKDYLRUFRPSOHWHO\)URPDQDQDO\WLFDOSRLQW
RIYLHZPRVWEHKDYLRUDODQRPDOLHVFDQEHLQWHUSUHWHGLQWHUPVRIPXOWLSOHVHOYHVHDFKKDVLWV
own scale of preferences, which renders the empirical behavior of an individual inconsistent.
The variety of deviations from the conventional rational choice model can be divided into 
WZRODUJHJURXSVFRJQLWLYHHUURUVDQGGHIHFWVRIWKHZLOO+RZHYHUPDQ\RIWKHPFDQEH
FRQVLGHUHGPDQLIHVWDWLRQVRIERWKLQWHOOHFWXDOOLPLWDWLRQVDQGLQVXI¿FLHQWVHOIFRQWURO7KH
QXPEHURIFRJQLWLYHDQGEHKDYLRUDOHUURUVLGHQWL¿HGDQGGHVFULEHGE\EHKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLVWV
LVODUJHDQGFRQVWDQWO\JURZLQJ$FFRUGLQJWRRQHRIWKHIDUIURPFRPSOHWHOLVWVWKHQXP-
EHULVDSSURDFKLQJ5L]]RDQG:KLWPDQ32XUDQDO\VLVLVOLPLWHGWRDVPDOO
sample of the most important ones.
+\SHUEROLFGLVFRXQWLQJ7KHWUDGLWLRQDOHFRQRPLFDQDO\VLVRILQWHUWHPSRUDOFKRLFHEXLOGV
XSRQWKHIDFWWKDWLQGLYLGXDOVSUHIHUSUHVHQWJRRGVWRIXWXUHRQHVDQGDUHZLOOLQJWRVDFUL¿FH
a larger amount of the latter to gain a smaller amount of the former. The proportions of this 
‘exchange’ are determined by the subjective parameters of time preference, which may vary 
5.DSHOLXVKQLNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
greatly between individuals. Some may be very patient (low discount rate), whereas others 
may be very impatient (high discount rate).
+RZHYHU DSHUVRQ¶V GLVFRXQW UDWH PXVW UHPDLQ XQFKDQJHG IRU ORQJWHUP GHFLVLRQV WR
be rational. In other words, the proportion of ‘exchange’ between any two periods must be 
GH¿QHGRQO\E\WKHGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQWKHPDQGPXVWEHLQGHSHQGHQWRIWKHGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQ
WKHPDQGWKHSUHVHQWPRPHQW,QWKLVFDVHIRUDQLQGLYLGXDOKDYLQJDGLVFRXQWIDFWRURI
JDLQHGLQWZR\HDUV¶WLPHZLOOEHHTXLYDOHQWWRJDLQHGLQD\HDUMXVWDVJDLQHG
LQD\HDUZLOOEHHTXLYDOHQWWRJDLQHGQRZ6XFKDGLVFRXQWLQJDOJRULWKPLVFDOOHGH[SR-
nential becauseas the time distance from the present moment increases, the decrease in the 
value of future goods follows an exponential curve.
+RZHYHUEHKDYLRULVWVKDYHIRXQGWKDWLQUHDOOLIHPDQ\PD\EHHYHQPRVWSHRSOHDFWDV
inconsistent ‘discounters,’ leaning toward hyperbolic, rather than exponential, discounting 
/DLEVRQ7KHGLVFRXQWUDWHVSHRSOHXVHDUHQRWVWDWLFEXWUDWKHULQFUHDVHDVWKHFRP-
pared periods come closer to the present moment. Thus, an individual may value $100 gained 
LQWZR\HDUVWREHHTXLYDOHQWWRJDLQHGLQD\HDUDQGDWWKHVDPHWLPHYDOXHJDLQHG
LQD\HDUWREHHTXLYDOHQWWRRQO\JDLQHGULJKWQRZ,QWKH¿UVWFDVHWKHGLVFRXQWIDFWRU
LVLQWKHVHFRQGLWLV
'HFLVLRQVPDGHXVLQJK\SHUEROLFGLVFRXQWLQJDUH WLPHLQFRQVLVWHQW)RUH[DPSOHDW t0, 
DQLQGLYLGXDOZLWKWKHWLPHSUHIHUHQFHVGHVFULEHGDERYHZRXOGEHZLOOLQJWRVDYHDWt1 
by depositing it with a bank at an interest rate that effectively yields $100 at t2 because this 
GHFLVLRQZRXOGEHDWWUDFWLYHJLYHQKLVGLVFRXQWIDFWRURI+RZHYHUZKHQt1 arrives, he 
ZLOODEDQGRQKLVRULJLQDOGHFLVLRQDQGVSHQGWKHLQVWHDGRIVDYLQJLWEHFDXVHGHSRVLW-
ing the money with a bank at the same interest rate would no longer be attractive for him at 
DGLVFRXQWIDFWRURI$VDUHVXOWGXHWRK\SHUEROLFGLVFRXQWLQJDQLQGLYLGXDOPD\EHFRPH
WRUQEHWZHHQRSSRVLWHGHFLVLRQVXQDEOHWRFKRRVHEHWZHHQWKHP+HPD\SODQWRVWDUWVDYLQJ
for retirement or take up a strict diet next year, but will abandon these ideas when the next 
year arrives.
%HKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLVWVFRQVLGHUWKLVEHKDYLRUREYLRXVO\LUUDWLRQDO0RVWRIWHQLWLVFDXVHG
E\LQVXI¿FLHQWVHOIFRQWURODQGUHÀHFWVVRPHLQGLYLGXDOV¶LQDELOLW\WRUHVLVWWHPSWDWLRQVLQWKH
SUHVHQWPRPHQW([FHVVLYHLPSDWLHQFHKLJKVKRUWWHUPGLVFRXQWUDWHZLOOPRWLYDWHWKHPWR
PDNHGHFLVLRQVZLWKLPPHGLDWHEHQH¿WVDQGGHOD\HGFRVWV+\SHUEROLFGLVFRXQWLQJPD\EH
the reason for phenomena such as addictive behavior (for example, to drugs or food), regular 
SRVWSRQHPHQWRILPSRUWDQWGHFLVLRQVEXLOGLQJSRUWIROLRVFRQWDLQLQJLQFRPSDWLEOH¿QDQFLDO
instruments (e.g., using high-interest credit cards while at the same time buying low-interest 
securities), excessive borrowing, or low saving rates.
+\SHUEROLFGLVFRXQWLQJPD\EHFRQVLGHUHGHYLGHQFHRIFRQÀLFWEHWZHHQWKHWZRVHOYHV
each with its own special utility function: one impatient and only concerned with the present , 
WKHRWKHUSUXGHQWDQGIXWXUHRULHQWHG7KHFRQÀLFWOHDGVWRLQFRQVLVWHQWEHKDYLRUZKHQWKH
right of decision-making is granted to the impatient self, it cancels prior decisions by the 
prudent self.
‘Cold’ and ‘hot’ psychological states. The current emotional state of an individual may 
KDYHDGHFLVLYHLQÀXHQFHRQKHUFKRLFHV,QELRORJLFDOO\µKRW¶VWDWHVHJDQJHUIHDUDGPL-
ration, and excitement), individuals are inclined to make spontaneous decisions, whereas 
in ‘cold’ states (e.g., calm, composure, and rational thought), decisions are well-measured 
&DPHUHUHWDO,QRWKHUZRUGVLQDµKRW¶VWDWHSHRSOHPD\UHDFWVXERSWLPDOO\RYHU-
HVWLPDWLQJ VKRUWWHUP EHQH¿WV DQG XQGHUHVWLPDWLQJ WKH FRUUHVSRQGLQJ ORQJWHUP FRVWV RI
DJLYHQGHFLVLRQ7KH\PD\EHFRPHPDUULHGLQD¿WRISDVVLRQRUFRPPLWVXLFLGHLQDSUR-
IRXQGGHSUHVVLRQ$IWHULQKDOLQJWKHDURPDRIOHDWKHUXSKROVWHU\LQDQH[SHQVLYHFDUDSHUVRQ
may be unable to resist the temptation to buy it.
+HUHDJDLQZHIDFHWKHFRQÀLFWEHWZHHQWKHWZRVHOYHVµKRW¶DQGµFROG¶ZLWKGLIIHUHQW
preference scales. It is obviously dangerous to trust the ‘hot’ self in making vital decisions 
that the ‘cold’ self may later bitterly regret.
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(UURUVRIRSWLPLVPDQGSHVVLPLVP7KHHUURURIRSWLPLVPPDNHVLQGLYLGXDOVRYHUO\VHOI
FRQ¿GHQWLQGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ,WLVDQXQGHUHVWLPDWLRQRIWKHSUREDELOLW\RIXQGHVLUDEOHHYHQWV
FDSDEOHRILQÀLFWLQJVHULRXVLIQRWLUUHSDUDEOHGDPDJH7KXVGULYHUVJHQHUDOO\XQGHUHVWL-
mate their own chances of having a car accident). This error results in excessive risk-taking 
HJLQYHVWLQJLQKLJKULVN¿QDQFLDODVVHWV$QRSSRVLWHW\SHRIHUURUDOVRRFFXUVPDNLQJ
SHRSOHORVHVHOIFRQ¿GHQFHDQGH[DJJHUDWHWKHSUREDELOLW\RIXQGHVLUDEOHHYHQWV7KLVOHDGV
to unreasonably strong risk aversion.
$YDLODELOLW\ ELDV7KLV ELDV LV HVVHQWLDOO\ WKH WHQGHQF\ WR RYHUHVWLPDWH SUREDELOLWLHV RI
particular events when an individual directly participates in them or witnesses those events. 
Thus, having been robbed in a certain part of a city, one tends to consider that neighborhood 
dangerous although it may not be any more dangerous than other areas in terms of crime 
VWDWLVWLFV$YDLODELOLW\ELDVFDQPDNHLQGLYLGXDOVDEDQGRQHYHQSURMHFWVZLWKYHU\PRGHUDWH
and reasonable risk levels, thereby damaging their own welfare. (In this sense, their actions 
are the opposite of those resulting from the error of optimism.)
&RQWH[W'HSHQGHQFH&RQWH[WGHSHQGHQFH FDQ WDNH WZR EDVLF IRUPV )LUVW WKHUH LV WKH
HIIHFWRIIUDPLQJPDNLQJDQLQGLYLGXDOFKRLFHGHSHQGHQWRQLQVLJQL¿FDQWDVSHFWVRIWKHVLWXD-
tion in which it is made. In this case, we are addressing a direct violation of the ‘in dependence 
of irrelevant alternatives’ principle (see above). These cases are situations in which the out-
come of a decision is determined by the formal characteristics of its frame, rather than by its 
contents. For example, people tend to choose A if options are ordered A–B and B if the order is 
B–A$WH[WERRNH[DPSOHIURPPHGLFDOSUDFWLFHLVZKHQWROGWKDWWKHVXUYLYDOUDWHRIDJLYHQ
FRXUVHRIWUHDWPHQWLVPRVWLQGLYLGXDOVDJUHHWRXQGHUJRLW&RQYHUVHO\ZKHQWROGWKDW
WKHJLYHQWUHDWPHQWKDVDIDWDOLW\UDWHPRVWWHQGWRUHIXVHLW
Second, there is an assessment of available alternatives based on comparisons with 
a certain reference level. The reference standard for comparison may be determined either 
by the individual’s past experience or by the context of decision-making. Thus, an individual 
may evaluate her welfare based on both absolute and relative income. That is, the higher 
the income of her reference group, the lower the perceived value of her own income, and 
vice versa.
The status quo bias is another important case of this sort of dependence, using the current 
VWDWHRIDIIDLUVDVWKHVWDUWLQJSRLQW7KLVELDVKDVEHHQH[WHQVLYHO\DQDO\]HG,WLVPDQLIHVWHG
LQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VWHQGHQF\WRDYRLGDQ\WKLQJQHZDOWKRXJKLWSURPLVHVFRQVLGHUDEOHEHQH¿WV
or low costs to abandon the old. One possible reason is the inclination to feel deeper regret 
DERXWDFWLRQVUDWKHUWKDQDERXWLQDFWLRQ$QRWKHUUHDVRQLVWKHWHQGHQF\WRSURFUDVWLQDWHLH
WRV\VWHPDWLFDOO\SRVWSRQHPDNLQJLPSRUWDQWGHFLVLRQV$WKLUGUHDVRQLVORVVDYHUVLRQLQWKH
face of equal gains and losses, i.e., the propensity to assign relatively higher negative value to 
the latter than positive value to the former. Loss aversion occurs when people evaluate gains 
DQGORVVHVLQFRPSDULVRQZLWKWKHVWDWXVTXRHJWKHLUFXUUHQWLQFRPH$QLQGLYLGXDOZKRVH
LQFRPHKDVULVHQIURPWRPD\IHHOPXFKKDSSLHUWKDQRQHZKRVHLQFRPHKDV
fallen from $20,000 to $10,000.
This phenomenon is associated with the famous endowment effect, i.e., a sharp increase 
LQWKHYDOXHRIDQLWHPULJKWDIWHULWVDFTXLVLWLRQ$IDLUDPRXQWRIH[SHULPHQWDOGDWDGHPRQ-
strates that the perceived value of an item for people is much higher when they possess it than 
when they do not. The sum of money they ask in exchange for giving away an item (when 
they possess it) tends to far exceed the purchase price they are willing to pay (when they do 
QRWSRVVHVVLW.QHWVFK
The most widely discussed practical example of status quo bias is associated with the 
choice of the so-called ‘default rules.’ It is a choice between alternative contract options, one 
of which is proposed to an agent ‘by default.’ The agent, however, may refuse it and choose 
DQRWKHU 6XQVWHLQDQG7KDOHUE7R LOOXVWUDWH WKLVZHFDQ UHIHU WR WKHFDVHV LQYROY-
LQJWKHPRVWFRPPRQW\SHRIUHWLUHPHQWSODQLQWKH86WKHNSODQQDPHGDIWHUWKH
DVVRFLDWHGDUWLFOHLQWKH86,QWHUQDO5HYHQXH&RGH
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86WD[ODZVDOORZHPSOR\HHVWRGHSRVLWSDUWRIWKHLUVDODU\WRWKHLUSHUVRQDOUHWLUHPHQW
savings accounts prior to withholding tax, according to retirement plans established by 
WKHLUHPSOR\HUV(PSOR\HHVFDQVLJQXSIRUDNSODQLQDQXPEHURIGLIIHUHQWZD\V
Some companies enlist their employees by default, reserving the latter’s right to withdraw. 
Others do the opposite. They do not enlist their employees by default, although the latter 
DUHIUHHWRVLJQXSDWDQ\WLPH,QWKH¿UVWFDVHGHGXFWLRQVLPPHGLDWHO\EHJLQWREHPDGH
from an employee’s salary to her retirement account, and she must submit a special appli-
cation if she wants to stop it. In the second case, deductions from the employee’s salary 
to her retirement account will not commence until she submits a written request. From 
WKHVWDQGSRLQWRIWKHVWDQGDUGUDWLRQDOFKRLFHPRGHOWKHDERYHSURFHGXUHVDUHLGHQWLFDO
hence, the proportion of participating and non-participating employees should be roughly 
WKHVDPHLQERWKFDVHV+RZHYHULQUHDOLW\WKLVLVQRWWKHFDVH$VWXG\RIGDWDIURPWKUHH
ODUJH86FRPSDQLHVKDVVKRZQWKDWDIWHUVZLWFKLQJWRGHIDXOWHQOLVWLQJ WKHSRUWLRQRI
HPSOR\HHVHQUROOHGLQWKHNSODQKDGJURZQIURP±WR±LQKDOID\HDU
(Choi et al., 2002).
Context-dependence may be considered the most obvious violation of the rationality prin-
ciple and the most salient example of preferences endogeneity. It points to an actual lack of 
preferences rather than their inconsistency. Sunstein and Thaler noted that when decisions are 
context-dependent, the very term ‘preference’ loses most of its meaning. In this type of situ-
ation, preferences are shaped at the very moment of choice, rather than preceding it. ‘If the 
DUUDQJHPHQWRIDOWHUQDWLYHVKDVDVLJQL¿FDQWHIIHFWRQWKHVHOHFWLRQVFXVWRPHUVPDNHWKHQ
WKHLUWUXHµSUHIHUHQFHV¶GRQRWIRUPDOO\H[LVW¶6XQVWHLQDQG7KDOHUE3
(YHQ WKLV VKRUW DQG LQFRPSOHWH RYHUYLHZ LV VXI¿FLHQW WR GHPRQVWUDWH KRZ KHDY\ DQG
varying losses caused by behavioral errors may be for the entire society, and for an individual . 
‘When consumers make errors, it is as if they are imposing externalities on themselves 
EHFDXVHWKHGHFLVLRQVWKH\PDNHGRQRWDFFXUDWHO\UHÀHFWWKHEHQH¿WVWKH\GHULYH¶&DPHUHU
HWDO3
The question of whether the state is capable of eliminating the ensuing welfare losses 
DULVHV %HKDYLRULVWV DQVZHU WKLV LQ WKH DI¿UPDWLYH RIIHULQJ DZLGH UDQJH RI JRYHUQPHQW
interventions that can help people act more rationally, based on their own ‘true’ interests. 
Behaviorists themselves take up the role of social therapists, prescribing an appropriate 
FRXUVHRIWUHDWPHQWIRUWKHVRFLHW\/RHZHQVWHLQDQG+DLVOH\
5. Under the banner of paternalism
%HKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLVWVFKDUDFWHUL]HWKHJHQHUDOQRUPDWLYHVWDQGDUGXQGHUO\LQJWKHLUSROLW-
ical recommendations as ‘paternalistic.’ In social philosophy, it is understood as any form 
of the third-party interference in a person’s life against her will (e.g., by the state, family, or 
FKXUFKEHFDXVHVXFKLQWHUIHUHQFHZRXOGLPSURYHKHUZHOIDUHDQGRUZRXOGQRWOHWKHUKDUP
herself 1. In other words, paternalism involves acts of coercion (restricting freedom of choice) 
DLPHGDWLPSURYLQJWKHZHOIDUHRIWDUJHWHGLQGLYLGXDOV$QLQGLYLGXDOLVDVVXPHGLQFDSDEOH
RILGHQWLI\LQJKHURZQWUXHLQWHUHVWVZKHUHDVVRPHRQHZKRNQRZVEHWWHUFDQDQGPXVWGH¿QH
these interests for her.
$OWKRXJKSDWHUQDOLVPFDQEHSUDFWLFHGERWKE\WKHVWDWHDQGSULYDWHHQWLWLHVµLQPRGHUQ
usage, the term usually refers to those laws and public policies which restrict the freedom 
RISHRSOHVRWKDWWKHLULQWHUHVWVPD\EHEHWWHUVHUYHG¶:HDOHFLWHGLQ.OHLQ
3±$FODVVLFH[DPSOHRISDWHUQDOLVWLFUHODWLRQVKLSVLVWKHSDUHQWFKLOGUHODWLRQVKLS
with the former restricting the behavior of the latter in the latter’s best interests with all types 
of taboos and prescriptions (e.g., do your homework, come home before dark, do not open 
the door to strangers). In the case of state paternalism, the state performs the function of the 
 1 KWWSSODWRVWDQIRUGHGXDUFKLYHVVXPHQWULHVSDWHUQDOLVP
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µIDWKHU¶DQGLWVµIDWKHUO\FDUH¶LVSHUIRUPHGRQLQGLYLGXDODGXOWVDOWKRXJKWKH\DUHUHFRJQL]HG
DVFDSDEOHDQGUHVSRQVLEOHFLWL]HQVE\WKHODZ
Paternalism may take on ‘harder’ and ‘softer’ forms, depending on how deeply it inter-
IHUHVZLWKLQGLYLGXDOGHFLVLRQV+DUGSDWHUQDOLVPLQYROYHVKHDY\UHVWULFWLRQRIFKRLFHRSSRU-
tunities, whereas the restrictions imposed by a soft paternalism are barely noticeable.
(FRQRPLFWKHRU\KDVXVXDOO\RSSRVHGSDWHUQDOLVWLFSROLF\ZKLFKOLPLWVLQGLYLGXDOIUHH-
dom of choice. This consistently anti-paternalistic attitude is quite understandable and can 
be easily explained. Indeed, if ‘the consumer is always right’ (always rational), then there is 
simply no room left for any improvement in her welfare through intervention into her deci-
sion making. In this case, any government interference can only cause damage by replacing 
consumers’ optimal decisions by different, suboptimal ones.
Consequently, traditional welfare economics allows restrictions on an individual’s free-
dom of choice subject only to the condition that the restrictions are aimed at improving the 
welfare of other individuals. This implies two theoretical arguments in favor of government 
LQWHUYHQWLRQLHUHIHUHQFHWRµPDUNHWIDLOXUHV¶DQGUHGLVWULEXWLYHFRQVLGHUDWLRQV$QXQUHJX-
ODWHGPDUNHWHLWKHUGRHVQRWIXQFWLRQVXI¿FLHQWO\HI¿FLHQWO\LHGRHVQRWHQVXUHHI¿FLHQW
resource allocation) or creates an income distribution structure inconsistent with the views 
RIHTXDOLW\SUHYDOHQWLQDJLYHQVRFLHW\*RYHUQPHQWLQWHUYHQWLRQLVRQO\MXVWL¿DEOHLQVXFK
FDVHV'LUHFWLQWHUYHQWLRQLQWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VGHFLVLRQVLVGHHPHGXQDFFHSWDEOHEHFDXVHLW
lacks any theoretical basis whatsoever.
Traditional regulatory means (e.g., taxes, subsidies and transfers) may change the budget 
constraints for consumers, but no encroachment upon their ‘sovereignty’ occurs. Consumers 
VWLOOKDYHWKH¿QDOVD\WKH\DUHJLYHQQRSUHVFULSWLRQVDQGPD\GHFLGHIRUWKHPVHOYHVKRZWR
react to such changes made by the state. In this sense, the traditional anti-paternalistic attitude 
of economic theory effectively limits potential state expansion.
+RZHYHULIWKHLGHDVRIEHKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLFVDUHFRUUHFWDQGHFRQRPLFDJHQWVSRVVHVV
only bounded rationality, then the situation changes drastically. The usual list of ‘market 
failures ’ is supplemented with a new, ‘behavioral’ one. Consequently, the taboo on pater-
nalistic intervention prescribed by traditional economic theory is no longer in effect, and the 
VWDWHJDLQVDFFHVVWRDPXFKEURDGHU¿HOGRIDFWLYLWLHV%HFDXVHSHRSOHDUHQRWLQVXUHGDJDLQVW
systematic errors, a caring government can (and must!) extend a helping hand to steer their 
behavior along a rational course using any means available.
8QGRXEWHGO\ WKH µQHZ¶ SDWHUQDOLVP EDVHG RQ WKH LGHDV RI EHKDYLRUDO HFRQRPLFV GLI-
fers greatly from the old paternalism in its normative standard and recommended types of 
state intervention. The ‘old’ paternalism was most often tinged with a distinctive religious or 
 moralistic hue. It ignored the preferences and interests of the ‘subjects,’ literally replacing 
them with those of the ‘caregiver.’ It was assumed, explicitly or not, that a paternalistic state 
knows better than individuals themselves do what their true welfare is.
The ‘new’ paternalism takes an entirely different stance. The subjective preferences of 
individuals serve as the normative standard. The ‘new’ paternalism, unlike the ‘old,’ is aimed 
at helping people achieve what they want. In other words, it tries to help them increase 
their level of subjective welfare, something they cannot do themselves due to cognitive or 
behavio ral limitations.
$QRWKHU GLIIHUHQFH RI HTXDO LPSRUWDQFH LV WKDWZKHUHDV WKH µROG¶ SDWHUQDOLVP WULHG WR
improve the welfare of individuals by taking away their freedom of choice, the ‘new’ pater-
nalism claims that government regulation can improve on the individual welfare without 
RU QHDUO\ ZLWKRXW UHVWULFWLQJ WKHLU SHUVRQDO DXWRQRP\ 0LWFKHOO  3 7KHUH
are differing, although very similar versions of this idea: the ‘asymmetrical paternalism’ of 
&DPHUHUHWDOWKHµVRIWSDWHUQDOLVP¶RI/RHZHQVWHLQDQG+DLVOH\DQGWKHµOLEHUWDULDQSDWHU-
nalism’ of Sunstein and Thaler.
$V\PPHWULFSDWHUQDOLVPLVUHDOL]HGWKURXJKJRYHUQPHQWLQWHUYHQWLRQVWKDWFUHDWHµODUJH
EHQH¿WVIRUWKHSHRSOHZKRDUHERXQGHGO\UDWLRQDO«ZKLOHLPSRVLQJOLWWOHRUQRKDUPRQWKRVH
5.DSHOLXVKQLNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
ZKRDUHIXOO\UDWLRQDO¶&DPHUHUHWDO37KHSURFODLPHGJRDORIVRIWSDWHUQDO-
LVPLVµWRHQKDQFHGHFLVLRQPDNLQJZLWKRXWUHVWULFWLQJLW¶/RHZHQVWHLQDQG+DLVOH\
3 µ/LEHUWDULDQSDWHUQDOLVP¶ VWULYHV WRPD[LPDOO\SUHVHUYH WKH IUHHGRPRI FKRLFHZKLOH
pursuing a paternalistic policy (hence the term ‘libertarian’). The state should only structure 
WKH¿HOGRIFKRLFHOHDYLQJ¿QDOGHFLVLRQVWRLQGLYLGXDOV6XQVWHLQDQG7KDOHUD
,QVSLWHRIWKHVHVWLSXODWLRQVµQHZ¶SDWHUQDOLVWV¿UPO\GHQ\WKHWUDGLWLRQDODQWLSDWHU-
nalistic attitude of economic theory. Sunstein and Thaler are the most uncompromising. 
They believe the ‘dogmatic paternalism’ of standard economic theory to be founded on 
one false assumption and two misconceptions. The false assumption is formulated as 
IROORZVµ>$@OPRVWDOOSHRSOHDOPRVWDOORIWKHWLPHPDNHFKRLFHVWKDWDUHLQWKHLUEHVW
interest or at the very least are better, by their own lights, than the choices that would be 
PDGHE\WKLUGSDUWLHV¶6XQVWHLQDQG7KDOHUE37KHDVVXPSWLRQLVLQYDOLG
from an empirical standpoint and has been disproved by multiple studies performed by 
beha vioral economics (see above). The two misconceptions are that, on the one hand, 
‘there are viable alternatives to paternalism’ and, on the other hand, ‘paternalism always 
LQYROYHV FRHUFLRQ¶ 6XQVWHLQ DQG 7KDOHU E 3± 6XQVWHLQ DQG 7KDOHU
believe both to be erroneous.
They base their counter-arguments on a case that became a textbook example of ‘new’ 
paternalism. It opens their book, Nudge 7KDOHUDQG6XQVWHLQ7KHH[DPSOHDGGUHVVHV
DGLOHPPD IDFLQJ WKH GLUHFWRU RI DFDIHWHULD RZQHG E\ D¿UP+HU FXVWRPHUVPRYH DORQJ
the counter, choosing which of the various dishes they prefer. The director noticed that the 
dishes that were placed earlier in line were in greater demand than were the others (the fram-
ing effect). She also knows about medical studies proving that people can improve their 
welfare by eating fewer cakes and more fruit. Therefore, how should she place the dishes? 
6XQVWHLQDQG7KDOHU LGHQWLI\ IRXURSWLRQVSODFH WKHGLVKHV UDQGRPO\SODFH WKHKHDOWKLHVW
LQ WKH GLUHFWRU¶V RSLQLRQ DW WKH EHJLQQLQJ RI WKH OLQH SODFH WKRVH WKDWZRXOGPDNH WKH
FXVWRPHUVDVREHVHDVSRVVLEOHDWWKHIURQWRUSODFH¿UVWWKRVHWKDWLQKHURSLQLRQZRXOGEHVW
¿WWKHLUSUHIHUHQFHV+RZHYHUWKHODVWRSWLRQLVRQO\SRVVLEOHLIWKHYLVLWRUVKDYHH[RJHQRXV
preferences independent from the context (i.e., the order of the dishes). If they have no such 
SUHIHUHQFHVSHRSOHFKRRVHFDNHVLIWKRVHDUHSODFHG¿UVWWKHVDPHZLWKIUXLWWKLVQRQSDWHU-
nalistic option falls out and the director must choose between the remaining ‘paternalistic’ 
RSWLRQV$VWKHFKRLFHRIVRPHIUDPHRUGHURIGLVKHVLVLQHYLWDEOHWKHJXLGLQJHIIHFWRIWKH
director’s decisions on the visitors’ choice is also inescapable. Therefore, she could not avoid 
nudging even if she wanted to. Thus, if you must nudge visitors by selecting this or that order 
of dishes as the default, at least it should be the healthiest option.
This leads to the conclusion that there is no real alternative to paternalism. ‘The central 
point, ’Sunstein and Thaler say, ‘is that effects on individual choices are often unavoid-
able. Of course, it is usually good not to block choices, and we do not mean to defend non-
libertarian paternalism here. But in an important respect, the anti-paternalistic position is 
incoherent simply because there is no way to avoid effects on behavior and choices. The task 
for the committed libertarian is not to avoid such effects but to preserve freedom of choice’ 
6XQVWHLQDQG7KDOHUE3
Sunstein and Thaler also consider the misconception that paternalism always involves 
FRHUFLRQWREHHUURQHRXV%\SXWWLQJ¿UVWIUXLWDQGWKHQFDNHVRQWKHFRXQWHU WKHGLUHFWRU
QXGJHVYLVLWRUVWRFKRRVHGLVKHVWKDWDUHPRVWLQOLQHZLWKWKHLULQWHUHVWV9LVLWRUVKRZHYHU
remain free to choose cakes if they want to. In other words, although paternalistic interven-
tion nudges (with the help of the framing effect) boundedly rational individuals in the direc-
WLRQFKRVHQE\WKHGLUHFWRULWZLOOQHYHULQÀXHQFHWKHEHKDYLRURIIXOO\UDWLRQDOLQGLYLGXDOV
who will choose dishes of their liking regardless of the order they appear (that is, framing). 
Thus, libertarian paternalism fully respects the preferences of rational consumers . On the 
other hand, because irrational consumers lack any structured preferences, there is nothing 
to respect. Thus, the nudge policy manages to combine paternalism and liberta rianism, 
 5.DSHOLXVKQLNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
in compatible as these may seem. These arguments lead Sunstein and Thaler to the conclusion 
that a transition is needed from the old, dogmatic and anti-paternalist attitude that economic 
theory has traditionally followed to a new, anti-dogmatic and paternalist one (Sunstein and 
7KDOHUE3±
1HYHUWKHOHVVWKHVHJHQHUDOGHFODUDWLRQVDUHQRWVXI¿FLHQWIRUWKHSUDFWLFDOLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
of ‘new’ paternalist ideas. First, it is necessary to determine which preferences of the multiple 
VHOYHVVKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGUHÀHFWLQJWKHµWUXH¶SUHIHUHQFHVRIDQLQGLYLGXDO:KRVHDFWVRI
choice should be taken as the starting point and whose should be discarded? ‘New’ pater-
QDOLVWVWU\WRVROYHWKLVSUREOHPE\XVLQJWKHFULWHULRQRIµLQIRUPHGGHVLUH¶6XJGHQ
37KLVFULWHULRQLPSOLHVWKDWLQGLYLGXDOVDFWDJDLQVWWKHLURZQLQWHUHVWVZKHQPDNLQJ
decisions ‘that they would change if they had complete information, unlimited cognitive 
DELOLWLHVDQGQRODFNRIVHOIFRQWURO¶6XQVWHLQDQG7KDOHUE37KHSUHIHUHQFHV
of selves whose decisions are the closest to the ideal of full rationality should be taken for 
granted. The preferences of selves whose decisions deviate from the ideal should be cor-
rected by the state’s paternalistic interventions.
This point of view implies that individuals do possess a set of well-structured ‘true’ prefe-
rences that, however, are manifested in a distorted form in observed acts of choice due to 
YDULRXVFRJQLWLYHDQGEHKDYLRUDOELDVHV7KXVWKHWDVNLVWRUHFRQVWUXFWWKHPVRPHKRZ$V
follows from the above quote by Sunstein and Thaler, the ‘new’ paternalists suggest solving 
it in a thought experiment, i.e., imagining what a given individual would choose if he were 
fully rational. The preferences thus reconstructed are considered the ‘true’ ones and become 
the normative standard for evaluating any forms of state intervention aimed at improving the 
welfare of individuals or that of society as a whole.
$VDUHVXOWWKHSRVLWLRQRIEHKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLVWVEHFRPHVDPELYDOHQWZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKH
VWDQGDUGUDWLRQDOFKRLFHPRGHOWKH\GHFLVLYHO\UHMHFWLWDVDGHVFULSWLYHWKHRU\EXWSUHVHUYH
LWDQGVWURQJO\LQVLVWRQLWVXQFRQGLWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHDVDQRUPDWLYHLGHDO7KXVWKHVWDWH
becomes a tool they intend to use to push the empirically observed behavior of boundedly 
rational individuals closer to the theoretical ideal of full rationality, i.e., convert them from 
boundedly to unboundedly rational. In this sense, behavioral economists do not abandon 
WKHVWDQGDUGPRGHORIUDWLRQDOLW\UDWKHUWKH\FDOOIRUSUDFWLFDOO\LPSOHPHQWLQJLWDVIXOO\DV
possible. ‘The irony is that behavioral economics, having attacked Homo oeconomicus as an 
empirically false description of human choice, now proposes, in the name of paternalism, 
to enshrine the very same fellow as the image of what people should want to be. Or, more 
SUHFLVHO\ZKDWSDWHUQDOLVWVZDQWSHRSOHWREH¶/HRQDUG3
6. Forms of behavioral policies
7KHQRUPDWLYHDFWLYLW\JHQHUDWHGE\EHKDYLRUDO HFRQRPLFV LV H[FHSWLRQDO$QHVWLPDWH
VKRZVWKDWLQRQO\¿YH\HDUVIURPWR$PHULFDQODZMRXUQDOVDORQHSXEOLVKHG
approximately 1,000 articles with proposals inspired by behaviorist ideas (Wright and 
Ginsburg, 2012).
The set of policies supported and approved of by the ‘new’ paternalists is a mixture of 
legislative and administrative restrictions, taxes, information disclosure schemes, and other 
means of convincing and manipulating the ‘choice architecture’ (a term coined by Sunstein 
and Thaler to denote alternative ways to describe one and the same choice situation). This 
involves not only the new, original recommendations but also a multitude of traditional means 
of state regulation that have been used before, but either without any theoretical support or 
by using the standard arguments drawn from traditional welfare economics (redistribution 
considerations or references to ‘market failures’).
Behaviorists tend to consider any form of government regulation desirable and admissible 
LIWKH\HIIHFWLYHO\HOLPLQDWHFRJQLWLYHDQGEHKDYLRUDOHUURUV5L]]RDQG:KLWPDQ1RW
DOOIRUPVDUHHTXDOVRPHDUHSUHIHUUHGWRRWKHUVVHHDERYH
5.DSHOLXVKQLNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
:HZLOO ¿UVW H[DPLQH WKH VWURQJHVW IRUP RI LQWHUYHQWLRQ LH GLUHFW SURKLELWLRQV WKDW
limit the possibilities of individual choice. These prohibitions, in the opinion of the ‘new’ 
paternalists, can and should be imposed when consumer irrationality is too high to be cor-
rected using softer means (e.g., disclosure requirements or ‘choice architecture’ manipula-
WLRQ'LUHFWUHVWULFWLRQVDUHFRQVLGHUHGDFFHSWDEOHLQDOOFDVHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKKLJKULVN)RU
example, adherents of behavioral economics support proposals to ban smoking in public 
places, protect the mandatory government retirement insurance system, prohibit drug use, 
and so on.
‘Sin taxes’, such as high excise taxes on alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and gambling, also 
HQMR\VXSSRUWIURPEHKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLVWV0DQ\DGGDQRWKHULWHPWRWKHOLVWMXQNIRRGVXFK
as fatty products and carbonated drinks. By increasing the direct costs of temptations, sin 
taxes may help to reduce the negative effects from defects of will and hyperbolic discounting, 
nudging boundedly rational individuals toward more reasonable behavior.
$UDWKHUVLPSOHPHWKRGUHFRPPHQGHGIRUFRUUHFWLQJPLVWDNHVPDGHE\SHRSOH LQµKRW¶
states of mind is to establish so-called ‘cool-off’ periods in the law. These periods can be 
DGGHGEHIRUHDQGDIWHUPDNLQJLPSRUWDQWGHFLVLRQV&DPHUHUHWDO
0DULWDOODZSURYLGHVDQH[DPSOHRIVHWWLQJVXFKDSHULRGH[DQWH,WXVXDOO\UHTXLUHVWKDW
WKHRI¿FLDO UHJLVWUDWLRQRI DPDUULDJHEHSHUIRUPHGXSRQH[SLU\RI DFHUWDLQSHULRG UDWKHU
WKDQ LPPHGLDWHO\DIWHU WKHDSSOLFDWLRQ LV¿OHG7KLVSHULRG LVJUDQWHG WRSUHYHQWDQ\SRV-
sible effects from a ‘hot’ state of mind on such an important decision as creating a family. 
([DPSOHV RI H[SRVW FRRORII SHULRGV FDQ EH IRXQG LQ FRQVXPHU ULJKWV OHJLVODWLRQ:KHQ
purchasing certain items (as a rule, expensive ones), such laws entitle consumers to return the 
item within a certain period with full reimbursement. Cool-off periods are also needed when 
making charitable donations (the donor may demand her money back within a certain time), 
for door-to-door trade, and so on.
$QRWKHUWRRODFWLYHO\VXSSRUWHGE\WKHµQHZ¶SDWHUQDOLVWVLVPDQGDWRU\LQIRUPDWLRQGLVFOR-
sures when making any major transaction involving a lease, mortgage, loans, and high-risk 
goods and services. Thus, they argue that sellers of harmful products (e.g., cigarettes), apart 
IURPJHQHUDOKD]DUGZDUQLQJVPXVWSURYLGHGHWDLOHGLQIRUPDWLRQFRQFHUQLQJWKHUHVSHFWLYH
ULVNVHJZLWKH[SODQDWLRQVRUVWDWLVWLFV7R¿JKWWKHLUUDWLRQDOSDVVLRQIRUORWWHULHVEHKDYLR
rists suggest printing detailed calculations of actual winning chances on lottery tickets.
+RZHYHUSURYLGLQJDEVWUDFWLQIRUPDWLRQRQSRWHQWLDOULVNVWRERXQGHGO\UDWLRQDOLQGLYL
duals (e.g., those prone to the error of optimism) may not yield desired results. In such cases, 
µQHZ¶SDWHUQDOLVWVVXJJHVWWDUJHWLQJWKHVXEFRQVFLRXVUDWKHUWKDQWKHFRQVFLRXV7R¿JKWWKH
error of optimism, another error can be used that is based upon availability bias. For example, 
WKLVFDQEHGRQHE\SULQWLQJZRUULVRPHSKUDVHVRQKD]DUGRXVSURGXFWVVXFKDVµ6PRNLQJ
kills’) and, if that does not help, by adding deterring stories and pictures. If this does not 
work either, some behavio rists believe consumers can even be told false deterring informa-
tion. These risk narratives are purported to facilitate decision making under high risk for 
boundedly rational individuals.
$GKHUHQWVRIEHKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLFVPRVWVWURQJO\UHFRPPHQGWKHSROLF\RIPDQGDWRU\
disclosure for consumer credit (Wright and Ginsburg, 2012). They do so because behavioral 
HUURUVDUHTXLWHFRPPRQLQ¿QDQFHDQGWKHFRVWVDUHYHU\KLJK8QGHUGLUHFWSUHVVXUHIURP
WKHEHKDYLRULVWVWKHGHVLJQRIPDQ\ORDQSURGXFWVZDVFKDQJHGLQWKH86DQGWKH&RQVXPHU
)LQDQFLDO 3URWHFWLRQ%XUHDXZDV HVWDEOLVKHG LQ WKH H[HFXWLYH EUDQFK'LVFORVXUH UHTXLUH-
ments are only the beginning of behaviorist recommendations. They also demand that man-
GDWRU\VWDQGDUGL]HGSURGXFWVEHXVHGDVGHIDXOWRSWLRQVLQORDQDJUHHPHQWV,QWKHLURSLQLRQ
before imposing complicated, ‘fancy’ loan options with numerous additional clauses on con-
VXPHUVEDQNVPXVW¿UVWRIIHUWKHVLPSOHVWPRVWEDVLFRSWLRQV$QRWKHUDFWLYHO\GLVFXVVHG
proposal addresses separating the saving and transactional functions of credit cards. Cards 
should be ‘split’ in two, so that one is used only to credit funds, and the other to pay for goods 
and services. Some behaviorists have voiced the highly radical idea of a full legislative ban 
 5.DSHOLXVKQLNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
on credit cards altogether because boundedly rational individuals cannot use such a sophisti-
FDWHG¿QDQFLDOLQVWUXPHQWZLWKRXWKDUPLQJWKHPVHOYHV:ULJKWDQG*LQVEXUJ
+RZHYHUWKHIDYRULWHEHKDYLRULVWLGHDRIFRXUVHLVPDQLSXODWLQJWKHµFKRLFHDUFKLWHFWXUH¶
or, in other words, the soft nudge policy. It is a new innovative contribution from behavioral 
economics to the practice of state regulation.
We have seen with the retirement plan examples that boundedly rational individuals may 
make completely opposite decisions depending on which of the available options are offered 
to them as the default. This is only one case out of many similar ones. Thus, in New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania, consumers were allowed to choose between partial and full coverage when 
signing auto insurance contracts. Car owners were offered partial coverage as the default 
RSWLRQLQWKHIRUPHUVWDWHDQGIXOOFRYHUDJHLQWKHODWWHU$VDUHVXOWRIRZQHUVFKRVHIXOO
FRYHUDJHLQ1HZ-HUVH\ZKHUHDVGLGVRLQ3HQQV\OYDQLD&DPHUHUHWDO3
0RVW(XURSHDQFRXQWULHVHPSOR\DV\VWHPWKDWDVVXPHVE\GHIDXOWWKDWHYHU\SHUVRQDJUHHV
to donate his organs after death. If a person objects, he must make it known (a mark is placed 
RQWKHGULYHU¶VOLFHQVH7KH86XVHGWKHRSSRVLWHDSSURDFKZKLFKDVVXPHVE\GHIDXOWWKDW
a person does not agree to donate his organs to others. If a person chooses otherwise, he must 
PDNHLWNQRZQDVSHFLDOPDUNLVSODFHGRQKLVGULYHU¶VOLFHQVH7KXVRYHURIWKHSRSX-
ODWLRQDUHSRWHQWLDOGRQRUVLQ(XURSHZKHUHDVWKHUHVSHFWLYHVKDUHLQWKH86LVXQGHU
6XQVWHLQDQG7KDOHUE3
When choosing whether to participate in a retirement savings plan, new paternalists 
insist that automatic enlisting should be the default option offered to employees because it 
would help rule out errors associated with the lack of willpower or hyperbolic discounting, 
IRUH[DPSOH$VLPLODUDSSURDFKVKRXOGEHXVHGLQWKHLURSLQLRQZKHQFKRRVLQJEHWZHHQ
HPSOR\PHQWFRQWUDFWRSWLRQV6XQVWHLQDQG7KDOHUEHJEHWZHHQFRQWUDFWVDOORZLQJ
WKHGLVPLVVDORIHPSOR\HHVDWZLOORURQO\VXEMHFWWRREMHFWLYHVWULFWO\GH¿QHGUXOHVEDVHGRQ
DOLPLWHGVHWRIUHDVRQVGLVPLVVDODWFDXVH([SHULHQFHVKRZVWKDWZKHQWKHGHIDXOWRSWLRQ
LVWKHGLVPLVVDODWZLOOPRVWHPSOR\HHVDJUHHWRLW+RZHYHUZKHQRIIHUHGWKHRSWLRQIRU
GLVPLVVDODWFDXVHPRVWHPSOR\HHVVHOHFWWKLVRSWLRQ$FFRUGLQJWRWKHEHKDYLRUDODSSURDFK
to increase employee welfare, the second, ‘friendlier’ approach should always be offered to 
employees as the standard contract (default option)2.
+RZHYHUWKHQDWXUHRISDWHUQDOLVWLFUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJWKHFKRLFHRIGHIDXOW
options may differ considerably. In certain cases, advocates of ‘new’ paternalism only try to 
FRQYLQFH¿UPVWRXVHWKHGHIDXOWRSWLRQVWKDWDUHPRVWLQOLQHZLWKµWUXH¶HPSOR\HHLQWHUHVWV
when choosing retirement savings plans. In others, they insist that the use of employer-
IULHQGO\RSWLRQVEH¿[HGLQWKHODZ,QVWLOORWKHUFDVHVWKH\JRHYHQIXUWKHUDQGFDOOIRU¿UPV
to be allowed to abandon friendly versions of employment contracts only in exchange for 
KHIW\HPSOR\HHFRPSHQVDWLRQ5L]]RDQG:KLWPDQ
$W WKH VDPH WLPH EHKDYLRUDO HFRQRPLFV GH¿HV RU DW OHDVW TXHVWLRQV PDQ\ WUDGLWLRQDO
approaches to government policy, in particular, any schemes that involve regulating and 
monitoring current economic behavior by using future rewards or penalties. 
)RULQVWDQFHLQPDQ\FRXQWULHVXQHPSOR\PHQWLQVXUDQFHV\VWHPVGRQRWSURYLGHEHQH¿WV
to people who decide to leave a job on their own. Thus, they make employees consider the 
IXWXUH QHJDWLYH HIIHFW ]HUR LQFRPH WKH\ FUHDWHZKHQPDNLQJ FXUUHQW GHFLVLRQV WR TXLW 
not to quit). Threatening a serious punishment tomorrow for irresponsible behavior today, 
they encourage employees not to make decisions that generate negative externalities for 
VRFLHW\LQWKLVFDVHKLJKHUH[SHQVHVIRUXQHPSOR\PHQWEHQH¿WV
+RZHYHUWKHVLWXDWLRQLVGLIIHUHQWLQWKHFDVHRIWKHPXOWLSOHVHOYHVLGHQWL¿HGE\EHKDYLRUDO
economic analysis. The decision to quit is made by one self, whereas the other is left without 
 2 $QRWKHULOOXVWUDWLRQRIWKHQXGJHSROLF\LVWKHUHMHFWHGSURSRVDORI1HZ<RUNPD\RU0%ORRPEHUJWREDQVDOHV
RIFDUERQDWHGGULQNVLQODUJHERWWOHVLQSXEOLFHQWHUWDLQPHQWDUHDV²FLQHPDVSDUNVDQGVRRQ$VDUHVXOWKHVDLG
the consumption of this unhealthy product would be reduced considerably (due to the framing effect).
5.DSHOLXVKQLNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
DQXQHPSOR\PHQWEHQH¿W,IWKH¿UVWVHOILVFRQFHUQHGRQO\ZLWKKHURZQZHOIDUHDQGLVLQGLI-
IHUHQWWRWKHZHOIDUHRIWKHRWKHUDQ\DWWHPSWVWRLQÀXHQFHKHUEHKDYLRUE\SXQLVKLQJWKH
RWKHUVHOIZLOOKDYHQRHIIHFW'HQ\LQJWKHEHQH¿WZLOORQO\DJJUDYDWHWKHRWKHUVHOI¶VVLWXD-
tion without changing anything about today’s behavior.
In other words, when addressing boundedly rational individuals, the state should rely not 
only on incentive schemes associated with future rewards or penalties but also on preven-
tive (including repressive) measures that punish current behavior (Saint-Paul, 2011). In this 
VLWXDWLRQIXWXUHVHOYHV¿QGWKHPVHOYHVLQDZHDNHUSRVLWLRQWRQHJRWLDWHDQGVKRXOGQRWEH
left without government support. (In our case, persons quitting their jobs should be equally 
HQWLWOHGWRWKHVDPHEHQH¿WVDVWKRVHZKRDUH¿UHGE\DQHPSOR\HUµ'LUHFWUHVWULFWLRQVRQ
FXUUHQWLUUDWLRQDOVHOYHVXQOLPLWHGVRFLDOVXSSRUWWRIXWXUHUDWLRQDOVHOYHV¶²WKLVLVKRZ
DJHQHUDOL]HGIRUPXODIRUWKHEHKDYLRUDODSSURDFKPLJKWDSSHDU
7. From a Welfare State to a Paternalistic State
$GKHUHQWVRIWKHµQHZ¶SDWHUQDOLVPVHHNWRDFFHQWXDWHLQHYHU\SRVVLEOHZD\LWVPRGHUD-
WLRQ ,Q WKHRSLQLRQRI&-ROOVDQG&6XQVWHLQ LW LVVRPHZKHUH LQEHWZHHQDODLVVH]IDLUH
V\VWHPDQGWKHWUDGLWLRQDOµKDUG¶SDWHUQDOLVP-ROOVDQG6XQVWHLQ&DPHUHUDQGKLV
co-authors describe their approach as ‘careful, cautious and disciplined’ (Camerer et al., 
6XQVWHLQDQG7KDOHUGH¿QH WKHLU LGHDVDVDµFRPSDUDWLYHO\ZHDNDQGQRQLQWUXVLYH
W\SHRISDWHUQDOLVP¶6XQVWHLQ7KDOHU3+RZHYHULVLWUHDOO\VR"
First, the scope of paternalistic recipes, as understood by the adherents of behavioral eco-
nomics, appears to be extremely broad (potentially, unlimited). For example, according to 
7KDOHUDQG6XQVWHLQµSHRSOHZLOOQHHGQXGJHVIRUGHFLVLRQVWKDWDUHGLI¿FXOWDQGUDUHIRU
ZKLFKWKH\GRQRWJHWSURPSWIHHGEDFNDQGZKHQWKH\KDYHWURXEOHWUDQVODWLQJDVSHFWVRI
DVLWXDWLRQLQWRWHUPVWKDWWKH\FDQHDVLO\XQGHUVWDQG¶7KDOHUDQG6XQVWHLQ3,Q
other words, they make the ‘nudge’ policy applicable to practically all possible deals, exclud-
ing regularly repeated transactions with ordinary goods and services.
6HFRQGWKLVSROLF\LVDGGUHVVHGWRWKHVRFLHW\DVDZKROHDQGQRWWRSDUWLFXODUVSHFL¿F
groups — because in certain situations, even functionally successful individuals can make 
serious cognitive and behavioral errors.
Third, the range of tools and methods of state intervention, which adherents of the behavio-
ral approach are ready to apply, also appears to be extremely wide. They do not limit them-
VHOYHV WR WKH WHFKQLTXHVRI WKH µVRIW¶SDWHUQDOLVPWKH\DGYRFDWHZKHQQHFHVVDU\ WKH\DUH
also ready to resort to all of the time-tested methods and tools associated with old-fashioned 
‘hard’ paternalism. Though other conditions being equal, the preferred methods are interven-
WLRQVWKDWPLQLPDOO\DEULGJHLQGLYLGXDOIUHHGRPRIFKRLFHGLUHFWEDQVGLUHFWLYHRUGHUVDQG
high taxes are not rejected either. When ‘soft’ paternalism measures do not yield the desired 
effect, the state may invoke ‘non-libertarian’ interventions that placed tight constraints on 
individual freedom of choice. Figuratively speaking, when the ‘soft nudge’ policy fails, it 
easily and smoothly turns into a policy of heavy ‘kicks and blows.’
Fourth, within the framework of the ‘new’ (and of the ‘old’) paternalism, relationships 
between the state and society develop along the same lines as relationships between adults 
DQGFKLOGUHQ$QGWKLVLVDVRXUFHRIWKUHDWIRUWKHJURZLQJLQIDQWLOL]DWLRQRIVRFLHW\+HUHLV
WKHYLFLRXVFLUFOHWKHPRUHLQIDQWLOHDVRFLHW\LVWKHPRUHLWPXVWEHSDWHUQDOL]HGE\WKHVWDWH
but the stronger this need, the less responsible and independent members of society become.
Fifth, the ‘new’ paternalism casts away normative restrictions on state activism that exists 
within traditional welfare economics. Traditional welfare economics considers state inter-
YHQWLRQ DV MXVWL¿DEOH RQO\ LI LQGLYLGXDO GHFLVLRQV DIIHFWHG VRPH WKLUG SDUW\ %\ FRQWUDVW
EHKDYLRUDO HFRQRPLFV MXVWL¿HV H[WHQVLYH JRYHUQPHQW LQWHUYHQWLRQV HYHQ ZKHQ DQ LQGLYL
dual’s decisions involve no one but himself (when there are no distribution or external effects 
whatsoever). Consequently, the scope of government control is dramatically extended.
 5.DSHOLXVKQLNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
Sixth, the very nature of state intervention changes. It goes beyond changing the external 
environment, in which individuals make decisions (in sets of incentives, to which they are 
VXSSRVHGWRUHVSRQG$SDWHUQDOLVWLFVWDWHUHDFKHVIXUWKHUDQGVWDUWVPDNLQJGHFLVLRQVIRUDQG
instead of individuals — either implicitly (by using various ‘nudges’) or explicitly (by using 
direct bans and orders).
Seven, most interventions advocated by adherents of the ‘nudge’ policy manifest them-
selves not consciously but subconsciously. In some cases, people may not even suspect that 
WKH\KDYHEHFRPHDQREMHFWRIPDQLSXODWLYHRUFRUUHFWLYHDFWLRQVRISROLWLFLDQV$VDFRQVH-
quence, such actions by the state spin out of the rational control of individuals.
Finally, in the long term, the ‘new’ paternalism may lead to the formation of a caste 
socie ty consisting of two different groups of individuals, rational and irrational, with differ-
ent rights and different scopes of responsibility. It is evident that irrational individuals may 
not be granted the same rights enjoyed by rational individuals and may not bear the same 
responsibility for their actions.
$OORIWKHVHDUHIXQGDPHQWDOO\QHZFKDUDFWHULVWLFVWKDWDUHQRWW\SLFDORIWKHZHOONQRZQ
canonical model of a welfare state. From here, G. Saint-Paul makes quite a plausible conclusion 
that we observe the process of the traditional ‘welfare state’ transforming into a ‘paternalistic 
state.’ In his view, this new paternalistic model rests on four main pillars (Saint-Paul, 2011).
1. To solve their behavioral problems, people need third-party intervention. The best can-
didate to play this role is the state.
([SHUWVFDQVWXG\ WKHHIIHFW WKDWFHUWDLQFKRLFHVKDYHRQ UHDOOLIHZHOIDUHDQGPDNH
decisions on behalf of individuals that are better than decisions that will be made by the indi-
viduals themselves.
$Q\ LQFHQWLYH VFKHPHV WKDWPDNH SHRSOH UHVSRQVLEOH IRU WKH FRQVHTXHQFHV RI WKHLU
past actions are ineffective. These should be replaced with schemes that would immediately 
reward or punish people for the future consequences of their current actions — consequences 
WKDWWKH\WKHPVHOYHVFDQQRWUHDOL]HDQGFRQVLGHU
,QWHUPVRISROLWLFVKRZSHRSOHIHHODERXWWKHPVHOYHVLQVRFLHW\LVPRUHLPSRUWDQWWKDQ
what they want or do.
/HWXVDQDO\]HHDFKRIWKHVHSRLQWVLQPRUHGHWDLO
+DYLQJWRDGGUHVVLQVXI¿FLHQWO\UDWLRQDOLQGLYLGXDOVDVWDWHFDQQRWOLPLWLWVHOIWRVHFXU-
ing only their protection from others. It is also the state’s duty to protect them from them-
selves. Because individuals are not capable of taking care of their ‘true’ long-term interests, 
there should be someone else to do that for them, and that role is best suited to the state. First, 
ZKHQGHYHORSLQJDSDWHUQDOLVWLFSROLF\WKHVWDWHFDQXVHH[SHUWUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVVHFRQG
for the effective implementation of such a policy, the state has a perfect tool, i.e., the exclu-
sive right of use of coercion. Therefore, the state can make the life of partially rational indi-
viduals better by forcing them (‘like it or not’) to become happier. Private agents and other 
institutions lack such capabilities and, therefore, are not good candidates for this purpose.
2. To implement a paternalistic policy, the state needs exact and accurate information 
about the psychological mechanisms governing human behavior. Such information can only 
be obtained through extensive social and psychological studies. This attributes a critically 
LPSRUWDQWUROHWRVFLHQWLVWVLQYROYHGLQVXFKVWXGLHV$FDGHPLFVFLHQFHLVEHJLQQLQJWRKDYH
the last word in determining political measures that should be taken by the state. Its assigned 
task is to identify ‘true’ individual preferences and then recommend to the state the most 
effective tools for satisfying them or, in other words, the most effective means of saving 
SHRSOHIURPWKHLUFRJQLWLYHDQGEHKDYLRUDOHUURUV,QWKLVVHQVHWKHNH\¿JXUHLVQRORQJHU
an economist but a psychologist, and society can be compared to a large psychotherapeutic 
clinic. From this point, it is not society but a narrow group of experts that is supposed to 
determine what is good and what is bad. This sharply narrows the scope of potential applica-
tions for the general constitutional norms, as there are no guarantees that they will always 
DQGLQHYHU\UHVSHFWDJUHHZLWKWKHFRQFOXVLRQVRIWKHQHZEHKDYLRUDOVFLHQFH$WWKHVDPH
5.DSHOLXVKQLNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
time, there is a risk that the results of social and psychological studies will be misused by 
politicians and special interest groups.
'LVSODFHPHQW RI H[ SRVW LQFHQWLYH VFKHPHVZLWK H[ DQWH SUHYHQWLYH UHVWULFWLRQV KDV
far-reaching consequences for the functioning of the legal system, for criminal and civil law 
in particular. In the context of multiple selves, it appears that one (irrational) individual com-
mits a criminal act but another (rational) individual must pay for it. It is as logical as punish-
LQJDQLQQRFHQWSHUVRQIRUDFULPHWKDWKHKDVQRWKLQJWRGRZLWK0RUHRYHULQWKHFDVHRI
abandoning the single self-concept, the very idea of punishment largely becomes senseless. 
By punish ing a rational self, it is impossible to interdict an irrational self from committing 
a crime, as the irrational self is driven by his short-term interests, with no consideration for 
long-term negative consequences that may appear and that will not be faced by the current 
self but rather by another, future self. To avoid such collisions, the emphasis in state policy 
VKRXOGEHVKLIWHGIURPSXQLWLYHPHDVXUHVWRSUHYHQWLYHPHDVXUHVFXUUHQWVHOYHVVKRXOGEH
VXEMHFWWRFRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKLFKWKH\ZLOOQRWEHDEOHWREHKDYHLUUDWLRQDOO\VSHFL¿FDOO\WR
commit crimes).
7KHVLWXDWLRQZLWKFLYLOODZLVVLPLODU8QGHUWKHFRQGLWLRQRIPXOWLSOHVHOYHVWKHWHUPVRI
QHJRWLDWHGFRQWUDFWVFDQQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGPXWXDOO\EHQH¿FLDOE\GH¿QLWLRQ,WLVRQHVHOIWKDW
signs the contract, but another self that bears obligations under it. In such a situation, the state 
LWVHOIVKRXOGGH¿QHWKHEDVLFFRQWUDFWWHUPVVRWKDWWKHFXUUHQWVHOYHVFDQGRQRKDUPWRWKH
future selves. In the long term, consolidation of a paternalistic state could lead to reformat-
ting the entire legal foundation of modern societies.
%HFDXVH FKRLFHV PDGH E\ SDUWLDOO\ UDWLRQDO LQGLYLGXDOV GR QRW UHÀHFW WKHLU µWUXH¶
preferen ces, they cannot serve as a normative benchmark for state policy. Such ‘true’ pre-
IHUHQFHVFDQEH UHÀHFWHGE\ WKH VRFLDO IHHOLQJRISHRSOH²WRZKDWH[WHQW WKH\DUH VDWLV-
¿HGRUGLVVDWLV¿HGZLWKOLIH$FFRUGLQJO\VWDWHSROLF\VKRXOGEHUHVSRQVLYHQRWVRPXFKWR
changes in the economic status of people or in their behavior as to changes in their subjec-
tive welfare.
Of course, the exact shape of the future model of a paternalistic state is not yet clear. It is 
EHLQJIRUPHGJUDGXDOO\DWDJUDVVURRWVOHYHOWKURXJKWKHSURJUHVVLYHEXLOGXSRIORFDOL]HG
LQWHUYHQWLRQVZKLFKDUHIUHTXHQWO\QRWLQWHUFRQQHFWHGDQGVHHPLQVLJQL¿FDQWDW¿UVWVLJKW
$SDWHUQDOLVWLFVWDWHLQWULQVLFDOO\JURZVRXWRIDZHOIDUHVWDWHDQGUHWDLQVPDQ\RILWVFKDUDFWH
ristic features. In particular, its objectives are identical to those of a traditional welfare state 
6DLQW3DXO+RZHYHU VHHNLQJ WRDWWDLQ VXFKREMHFWLYHV LW VWDUWVXVLQJPXFKPRUH
‘petty’ and intrusive forms of control and regulation.
Surely, it would be naive to believe that a paternalistic state emerges as a direct result of the 
appearance of behavioral economics and the widespread acceptance of its ideas. It is rather 
about two parallel processes — real and intellectual. Paternalistic patronage of the society is, 
DSSDUHQWO\DµJHQHWLF¶SUHGLVSRVLWLRQIRUWKHLQVWLWXWLRQRIVWDWHDVVXFK+RZHYHULWZRXOG
be a mistake to underestimate the role of behavioral economics in this process. Behavioral 
HFRQRPLFVUDWLRQDOL]HGPDQ\IRUPVRILQWHUYHQWLRQZKLFKZHUHVSRQWDQHRXVO\XVHGE\WKH
state, by substantiating them with a theoretical foundation and thus making them intellectu-
DOO\ UHVSHFWDEOH$W WKH VDPH WLPH LW VXJJHVWHG DJUHDWPDQ\QHZPRUHUH¿QHG WRROV IRU
paternalist policy. It was due to behavioral economics that, as Saint-Paul stated, the last bas-
tion of rationalism in social disciplines fell, such bastion being represented until recently by 
economic science (Saint-Paul, 2011). In all of these respects, behavioral economics undoubt-
edly contribu ted to the gradual shift toward a paternalistic bias in the activities of modern 
governments.
8. Critical appraisal
Behavioral economics is a complex and heterogeneous phenomenon, and its normative 
SURJUDPFDQEHDQDO\]HGIURPPDQ\GLIIHUHQWDQJOHV:HZLOOIRFXVRQDQXPEHURILQWHU
 5.DSHOLXVKQLNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
UHODWHGTXHVWLRQV+RZUHOLDEOHDUHHPSLULFDOGDWDXQGHUO\LQJLWVQRUPDWLYHFRQFOXVLRQV"7R
what extent are the key tenets feasible, and what obligations do they impose on the state? 
+RZFRQYLQFLQJLVLWVWKHRUHWLFDOMXVWL¿FDWLRQ")LQDOO\DUHµQHZ¶SDWHUQDOLVPDQGWKHWUDGL-
tional ‘old-fashioned’ paternalism really divided by a tight conceptual boundary, as adherents 
of the behavioral approach are prone to believe?
1. Though it is already quite mature, behavioral economics still appears to be just a roster 
of separate empirically observed psychological phenomena. There have been no attempts to 
join these under any particular synthetic concept. Behavioral economics suggests no ‘general 
WKHRU\RIFRJQLWLYHHUURUV¶PRUHRYHULWVDGYRFDWHVGRQRWVHHPWRQHHGVXFKDWKHRU\:ULJKW
DQG*LQVEXUJ$VDUXOHWKH\FRQWHQWWKHPVHOYHVZLWKVLPSOHGHVFULSWLRQVRIFHUWDLQ
UHSHDWLQJEHKDYLRUDOUHDFWLRQVZLWKRXWLQTXLULQJDERXWWKHLUSRVVLEOHFDXVHV*UQH<DQRII
2012). Consequently, the political program of ‘new’ paternalism also lacks any general con-
ceptual foundation and reverts into many small and petty interventions ‘on the occasion,’ 
which are almost unrelated to each other.
(TXDOO\WKHUHKDYHEHHQQRV\VWHPDWLFDWWHPSWVZLWKLQEHKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLFVWRDVVHVV
the frequency of various cognitive and behavioral errors. What is the quantitative ratio of 
rational to irrational individuals? It is one thing if, say, a vast majority of the society is sub-
MHFW WR K\SHUEROLF GLVFRXQWLQJ ,W LV DQRWKHU WKLQJ LI LW DSSOLHV WR DSLWLDEOHPLQRULW\ LW LV
yet another thing if we can talk about hyperbolic discounting only with respect to certain 
VRFLDOJURXSV8VXDOO\EHKDYLRULVWVRQO\PDNHJHQHUDOVWDWHPHQWVDERXWDQH[WUHPHO\QRQ
XQLIRUPGLVWULEXWLRQRIEHKDYLRUDODQRPDOLHVZLWKLQDSRSXODWLRQ+RZHYHUWKLVVHOHFWLYLW\
has no effect on their normative recommendations, which are applicable by default to the 
HQWLUHVRFLHW\ZLWKRXWH[FOXVLRQ7KLVDSSOLFDELOLW\LVMXVWL¿HGE\WKHLGHDVRIµDV\PPHWULF¶
or ‘ libertarian’ paternalism. Since, as is asserted, the interventions resting on these ideas 
impose almost no costs on rational individuals and preserve their freedom of choice, then 
even if the state acts assuming (incorrectly) that all members of the society are irrational, it 
will not cause any serious problems.
+RZHYHUHYHQDPLQRUVKLIWWRZDUGVPHDVXUHVXVHGZLWKWUDGLWLRQDOµKDUG¶SDWHUQDOLVP
FDQLQYDOLGDWHWKHVHDUJXPHQWV$WWKLVSRLQWHPSLULFDOGDWDRQWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRIEHKDYLRUDO
errors among the population becomes critical. Without considering this distribution, a pater-
nalist policy will most likely fail and is likely to worsen the welfare of the community.
7KHQRUPDWLYHSURJUDPRIWKHVRFDOOHGµQHZ¶SDWHUQDOLVPLVEXLOWXSRQDVKDN\HPSLUL-
FDO IRXQGDWLRQ7KHH[SHULPHQWDO¿QGLQJV LWDSSHDOV WRDUHIDU IURPFRQFOXVLYHHQRXJKWR
PDNH¿UPUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVIRUWKHVWDWH7KHPRVWVWULNLQJLOOXVWUDWLRQRIWKLVGLVFRQQHFWLV
SHUKDSVSURYLGHGE\WKHIDPRXVµHQGRZPHQWHIIHFW¶¿UVWUHFRUGHGE\7KDOHU7KDOHU
ZKLFK IRUPDQ\\HDUVZDV UHJDUGHG DV WKHPRVW UHOLDEOH DQG LPSRUWDQW HPSLULFDO¿QGLQJ
among those ever made in behavioral economics.
Interest to this effect was fueled, largely, by the far-reaching practical conclusions that 
follow from it. The fact is that the endowment effect is in direct contradiction to the predic-
tions following from the Coase Theorem and can be regarded as its refutation. With this 
particular effect, the assignment of property rights ceases to be a neutral factor and starts to 
LQÀXHQFHWKHVWUXFWXUHRISURGXFWLRQDQGHI¿FLHQF\HYHQZKHUHWUDQVDFWLRQFRVWVDUH]HUR
Indeed, if the very fact of possessing a certain good automatically increases its value for 
indivi duals, then property rights can remain forever with less effective owners and never 
pass on to more effective ones. In such a situation, the issuing of the initial delineation of 
property rights becomes crucial, and the legal system should be developed in consideration 
of this factor.
  $FFRUGLQJ WR VRPH HVWLPDWHV RXW RI DOO WKH DUWLFOHV SXEOLVKHG LQ$PHULFDQ ODZ MRXUQDOV RYHU WKH SDVW WZR
decades, more than one thousand referred to the endowment effect. Its discussion resulted in numerous proposals to 
completely revise the existing norms in various legal domains, e.g., property, tort, contracts and intellectual property 
(Wright and Ginsburg, 2012. P. 11).
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Laboratory experiments proving the existence of the endowment effect are usually con-
ducted using certain cheap objects. For example, one group of subjects is given mugs, while 
the other group gets chocolate bars, of an approximately equal value. The mug owners are 
then offered to exchange their mugs for chocolate bars and, in parallel, chocolate bar own-
HUVDUHRIIHUHGWRH[FKDQJHWKHLUFKRFRODWHEDUVIRUPXJV7KHYHU\¿UVWH[SHULPHQWEURXJKW
DERXWVXUSULVLQJUHVXOWVLQWKH¿UVWJURXSRIVXEMHFWVUHIXVHGWRSDUWZLWKWKHLUPXJV
DQGRIVXEMHFWVLQWKHVHFRQGJURXSUHIXVHGWRJLYHDZD\WKHLUFKRFRODWHEDUV.QHWVFK
)URPWKLV¿QGLQJLWZDVFRQFOXGHGWKDWLQGLYLGXDOSUHIHUHQFHVGHSHQGXSRQWKHREMHFWV
WKH\KDSSHQWREHµHQGRZHGZLWK¶LQODERUDWRU\FRQGLWLRQVWKLVLVZK\LQWKH¿UVWFDVHPRVW
of the participants preferred to keep their mugs, whereas in the second the participants chose 
to keep chocolate bars. The subjects from both groups refused to part with what they came 
to own during the experiment. This actually implies that when selling an object (owned by 
them),participants set a much higher price for it than when buying it (when it is not owned 
by them).If agents had exogenous preferences that were independent of the context (in the 
case in question, the initial ownership), these results would not be possible. The sale and the 
purchase price would necessarily be identical.
:KDWLVWKHFDXVHRIVXFKDQH[FKDQJHDV\PPHWU\"$VWDQGDUGH[SODQDWLRQDWWULEXWHVLWWR
the endowment effect, which, in turn, arises from the fact that an individual is subject to loss 
DYHUVLRQ$FFRUGLQJWRWKLVH[SODQDWLRQSHRSOHDVVHVVWKHLUORVVHVIURPSDUWLQJZLWKDQLWHP
DQGWKHEHQH¿WVIURPDFTXLULQJLWGLIIHUHQWO\7KHDVVXPHGORVVHVDOPRVWDOZD\VVHHPPRUH
VLJQL¿FDQWWRWKHPWKDQWKHDVVXPHGEHQH¿WV$VDUHVXOWZKHQVHOOLQJDQLWHPWKH\VHWWKH
price higher than what they would agree to as a purchaser.
+RZHYHU WKLVFRQYHQWLRQDOH[SODQDWLRQZDVFKDOOHQJHG LQ WKHVWXGLHVRI&K3ORWWDQG
.=HLOHU 3ORWW DQG=HLOHU 7KH\QRWHG WKDW WKHREMHFWV HQGRZHGGXULQJ WKH
H[SHULPHQWPD\ EH SHUFHLYHG E\ VXEMHFWV DV JLIWV IURPRUJDQL]HUV WKH YHU\ IDFW WKDW WKH
REMHFWZDVHQGRZHGE\WKHH[SHULPHQWRUJDQL]HUVPD\EHLQWHUSUHWHGE\VXEMHFWVDVDSURRI
RI LWVKLJKHUTXDOLW\ZKHQVXEMHFWVZHUHRIIHUHG WRVHOO WKHREMHFW LQ WKH¿UVWSDUWRI WKH
experiment), the endowed object was right before their eyes, whereas when they were offered 
WREX\ WKHREMHFW LQ WKHVHFRQGSDUW LWZDVQRWSUHVHQWHG WR WKHPGHFLVLRQV WRVHOOEX\
objects were made publicly, in the presence of other participants.
$IWHU 3ORWW DQG =HLOHU PRGL¿HG WKH SURFHGXUH WR WDNH WKHVH IDFWRUV LQWR DFFRXQW WKH
exchange asymmetry disappeared. The number of participants who preferred to keep mugs 
LQWKH¿UVWSDUWRIH[SHULPHQWSUDFWLFDOO\HTXDOHGWKHQXPEHURISDUWLFLSDQWVZKRFKRVHWR
buy them in exchange for chocolate bars (in the second part of experiment). In other words, 
upon a closer analysis, the endowment effect appears to be an artifact. It was vividly dem-
onstrated that the cause of the exchange asymmetry from which it originates is not directly 
related to ‘loss aversion,’ and that the exchange asymmetry implies no underlying behavioral 
G\VIXQFWLRQVEXWUDWKHU¿WVLQWRWKHFRQYHQWLRQDOPRGHORIFKRLFHTXLWHZHOO
This case study of the best-known behavioral ‘anomaly’ illustrates a more general problem 
concerning any potential manifestations of irrationality, their dependence upon the smallest 
GHWDLOVRIKRZWKHH[SHULPHQWLVDUUDQJHG0RUHVSHFL¿FDOO\ZHFDQQHYHUNQRZIRUFHUWDLQ
ZKDWLVEHKLQGDVSHFL¿FDVVXPHGDQRPDO\DUHDOFRQWUDYHQWLRQRIWKHUDWLRQDOLW\SULQFLSOH
RU VRPH SHFXOLDULWLHV RI WKH ODERUDWRU\ SURFHGXUHV$TXHVWLRQ DULVHV DV WR ZKHWKHU VWDWH
policy be built upon observations that are so sensitive to even minor changes in the setup of 
laborato ry experiments.
$GKHUHQWVRIWKHµQHZ¶SDWHUQDOLVPLPSOLFLWO\DVVXPHWKDWSROLWLFLDQVNQRZWKHµWUXH¶
SUHIHUHQFHVRILQGLYLGXDOVEHWWHUWKDQWKHLQGLYLGXDOVWKHPVHOYHV+RZHYHUWKHIDFWWKDWUHDO
people are not perfect and can make errors (even systematically) is not enough to conclude 
WKDWSHRSOHQHHGRUGHVLUHWREHµSDWHUQDOL]HG¶E\WKHVWDWH7KHµQXGJH¶SROLF\VKRXOGEHDQD-
O\]HGLQDFRPSDUDWLYHLQVWLWXWLRQDOSHUVSHFWLYH
,QGLYLGXDOVFDQEHLPSHUIHFWXWLOLW\PD[LPL]HUVDQGDWWKHVDPHWLPHEHFDSDEOHRIUHDFK-
ing higher levels of utility when making choices on their own, compared to when choices 
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DUHPDGHIRUWKHPE\WKLUGSDUWLHVLQFOXGLQJWKHVWDWH7KH\PD\QRWIXOO\UHDOL]HWKHLURZQ
preferences, but still they know more about them than anybody else, even the people closest 
to them.
This suggestion is supported by the results of a study by J. Waldfogel (Waldfogel, 2005). 
The study compares how individuals evaluate items that they ‘gifted’ to themselves during 
the holidays and gifts that they received from relatives and friends. It appeared that on aver-
DJHWKHYDOXHRIWKHLWHPVWKDWLQGLYLGXDOVERXJKWWKHPVHOYHVZDVDSSUR[LPDWHO\KLJKHU
than the value of gifted things, even though the gifts were made by the closest associates, 
who should know well the preferences and wishes of the gift recipients.
$VLVWREHH[SHFWHGIULHQGVDQGUHODWLYHVVKRXOGNQRZPRUHDERXWDSHUVRQ¶VµWUXH¶LQWHU-
HVWVWKDQSXEOLFRI¿FLDOVRUSROLWLFLDQV6RLIHYHQµFORVH¶DVVRFLDWHVKDYHRQO\DURXJKLGHDRI
what individuals whom they know very well prefer, what can be expected from ‘far’ associ-
ates — for example, agents representing the state?
5. For a paternalistic policy to be successful, the state should possess gigantic amounts 
RILQIRUPDWLRQ5L]]RDQG:KLWPDQ,QSDUWLFXODUWKHVWDWHVKRXOGNQRZWKHIROORZ-
LQJWKHµWUXH¶SUHIHUHQFHVRILQGLYLGXDOVDSRLQWWRZKLFKZHZLOOUHWXUQODWHUZKLFK
VSHFL¿FHUURUVDUHPDGHE\LQGLYLGXDOVDQGLQZKLFKVSHFL¿FVLWXDWLRQVZKDWLVWKHFRVW
RIWKHVHHUURUVHJWKHH[WHQWRIWKHLUQHJDWLYHLPSDFWRQZHOIDUHZKHWKHULQGLYLGXDOV
take any steps themselves to prevent their errors and, if they do, to what extent such steps 
DUHHIIHFWLYHKRZGLIIHUHQWHUURUVDUHLQWHUUHODWHGZKDWLVWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRISRVVLEOH
corrective measures available to the paternalistic state?
It is clear that simply stating that people are subject to certain behavioral errors is not 
enough. The state should know the exact situations in which such errors are made. Without 
this knowledge, interventions by the state will appear to be either excessively extensive 
(involving situations wherein individuals do not make errors) or too narrow (neglecting cer-
tain situations wherein individuals make errors). The state should also understand the conse-
quences of various behavioral anomalies in terms of welfare, and its interventions should be 
VL]HGDFFRUGLQJWRWKHVHYHULW\RIWKHSDUWLFXODUHUURU(UURUVOHDGLQJWRKXJHORVVHVLQZHOIDUH
would justify intervention, whereas errors leading to minor losses would not.
,QGLYLGXDOVGRQRWUHPDLQLQGLIIHUHQWWRWKHLUEHKDYLRUDOHUURUV4XLWHRIWHQWKH\UHDOL]H
them and make focused attempts to eliminate them (for example, people prone to obesity or 
drunkenness can avoid places, situations and circumstances in which temptation may be too 
VWURQJWKH\FDQWUDLQWKHLUZLOOSRZHUVHHNWKHVXSSRUWRISHRSOHDURXQGWKHPHWF,IWKH
state neglects all of these factors, instead of enhancing welfare, its interventions could make 
an outcome worse (for example, by strengthening external controls over human behavior, 
correspondingly weakening incentives towards self-control).
'LIIHUHQWFRJQLWLYHDQGEHKDYLRUDOHUURUVPD\EHLQWHUFRQQHFWHGWKH\FDQHLWKHULQFUHDVH
RU QHXWUDOL]H HDFK RWKHU¶V HIIHFWV 8QGHU VXFK SRWHQWLDOO\ FRQWUDGLFWRU\ FRQGLWLRQV LW LV
H[WUHPHO\GLI¿FXOWWRGHWHUPLQHWKHRSWLPXPH[WHQWRILQWHUYHQWLRQ%HKDYLRUVWKDWVHHPWR
be optimal if only one particular anomaly is taken into account can turn out to be sub-optimal 
if all errors are taken into account simultaneously. In the absence of detailed information 
about how different biases are inter-connected, a paternalistic policy is likely to be counter-
productive. For example, by correcting the optimism bias, the negative consequences related 
to the pessimism bias will increase.
Finally, the state should be capable of accurately estimating the effectiveness of vari-
ous corrective measures(e.g., it when will be enough to provide more complete information, 
when it is more appropriate to manipulate frames, in what situations it is more effective to 
use ‘sin taxes,’ and in what situations are direct bans indispensable?)
0HHWLQJWKHVHLQIRUPDWLRQDOUHTXLUHPHQWVLVDSUDFWLFDOO\LUUHVROYDEOHWDVN7KHYROXPH
RILQIRUPDWLRQQHHGHGE\DSDWHUQDOLVWLFVWDWHWRSXUVXHD¿QHWXQLQJSROLF\LVKDUGO\VPDOOHU
than the volume of information that was needed by a central planning system for its effective 
functioning.
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%HKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLFVFULWLFL]HVWKHQHRFODVVLFDOFRQFHSWRIDK\SHUUDWLRQDOLQGLYLGXDO
while, in fact, promoting the state as a hyper-rational agent at the same time. This oversight 
is even more surprising as the multiple selves of an agent represented by the ‘state’ can be 
UHIHUHQFHGQRW¿JXUDWLYHO\EXWTXLWHOLWHUDOO\
Behaviorist reasoning implies that participants in the political process (voters, parties, 
H[SHUWVSROLWLFLDQVDQGSXEOLFRI¿FLDOVKDYHDQLQQDWHLPPXQLW\WRFRJQLWLYHDQGEHKDYLRUDO
errors. The reality is far from it. Governments are liable to errors as much as individuals. 
7KH\KDYHVKRUWSODQQLQJKRUL]RQV7KH\DSSO\XOWUDKLJKGLVFRXQWUDWHVZKHQEHQH¿WVIURP
certain decisions can be obtained right away whereas the costs will be incurred in the distant 
future. They easily give in to temptations promising short-term political dividends. They tend 
WRPDNHSURPLVHVDQGWKHQEUHDNWKHPZKHQLWLVWLPHWRIXO¿OOZKDWKDVEHHQSURPLVHG7KH\
RIWHQPDNHGHFLVLRQVLQDµKRW¶SV\FKRORJLFDOFRQGLWLRQ$QGDVKLVWRULFDOH[SHULHQFHVKRZV
most real political leaders can hardly be regarded as an ideal of clear reasoning and emotional 
EDODQFH*ODHVHU
Furthermore, there is every reason to believe that, in politics, behavioral anomalies are 
much more widely spread than in any other sphere. Compared to other spheres, in politics, 
the incentives to correct errors and to control irrational impulses on the parts of the policy 
makers are weaker as the consequences of the errors made by politicians affect them very 
OLWWOHDQGSULPDULO\LQÀXHQFHWKHVRFLHW\DWODUJH*ODHVHU
7KHUHLVDQRWKHUIDFWRUWRFRQVLGHUWKHSUHVVXUHVDSSOLHGE\VSHFLDOLQWHUHVWJURXSV$V
a consequence, in political markets, risks of the exploitation of behavioral errors (manipula-
tion of errors in the interests of individual politicians or lobby groups) appears to be much 
KLJKHUWKDQLQHFRQRPLFPDUNHWVFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\DWRXJKFRPSHWLWLYHGLVFLSOLQH
Finally, it is important that the errors of individuals and states have entirely different con-
VHTXHQFHVRQZHOIDUHµ+XPDQEHLQJVDVULJKWIXOO\QRWHGE\(*ODHVHUHUUEXWWKHZHOIDUH
losses created by private errors are surely second-order relative to the welfare losses created 
by governments. Individuals may procrastinate and invest foolishly, but they do not volun-
WDULO\HQUROOLQFRQFHQWUDWLRQFDPSV¶*ODHVHU3
Seeking to restrict behavioral biases in private life, the behaviorist normative framework 
GUDVWLFDOO\H[WHQGVSRVVLELOLWLHVIRUEHKDYLRUDOELDVHVLQSROLWLFV+HQFHLQPDQ\FDVHVLWPD\
happen that the ‘medicine’ appears to be much worse than the ‘disease.’
$QRWKHUFULWLFDOO\LPSRUWDQWTXHVWLRQLVWRZKDWH[WHQWWKHUHVXOWVRIODERUDWRU\H[SHUL-
PHQWVFDQEHWUDQVODWHGLQWRKXPDQEHKDYLRUµLQWKH¿HOG"¶,QWKHODERUDWRU\VXEMHFWVRIWHQ
¿QG WKHPVHOYHV LQ XQXVXDO FRQGLWLRQVPXVW IDFH SUREOHPV WKDW DUH QHZ WR WKHP DQG LQ
most cases, get merely a symbolic remuneration for participating in the experiment. In real 
OLIHSHRSOHKDYHWKHDELOLW\WRJDLQH[SHULHQFHDQGWKHSUR¿WVDQGORVVHVWKDWUHZDUGWKHP
for rational decisions or punish them for irrational ones are incomparably larger. Thus, they 
KDYHVWURQJLQFHQWLYHVWRVSHFLDOL]HDQGOHDUQWRDYRLGHUURUVLQFHQWLYHVWKDWDUHJHQHUDOO\QRW
found in laboratories.
Behaviorists tend to ignore the obvious fact that rational behavior is not an innate characte-
ristic of man. It is gradually formed through the process of learning, and it is impossible to 
acquire it by skipping a (short or long) period of erroneous (irrational) decisions, during 
which experience is accumulated. People learn from errors and, in this context, rational-
ity and behavioral biases are not necessarily mutually exclusive as is, in fact, suggested 
E\ EHKDYLRUDO HFRQRPLFV$PRQJRWKHU WKLQJV WKLV LPSOLHV WKDW LQ WKH DWWHPSW WR SURWHFW
individuals from demonstrating irrationality, a state’s paternalistic policy may hinder indi-
viduals from gaining experience (i.e., developing rational behavioral skills), rendering them 
ultimately less rational.
The laboratory environment is institutionally sterile. It almost completely lacks the various 
tools for preventing and correcting behavioral errors that are available to people in real life. 
The behavior of a given person in institutionally poor and institutionally rich environments 
FDQEHGUDPDWLFDOO\GLIIHUHQW6XJJHVWLRQVWKDWLQVWLWXWLRQVPDUNHWRQHVLQWKH¿UVWSODFH
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make human behavior more rational than it is by itself are a long-standing topic of economic 
WKHRU\VWDUWLQJZLWK$GDP6PLWK$QHIIHFWLYHV\VWHPRI LQVWLWXWLRQV UDGLFDOO\ ORZHUV WKH
requirement for the rationality of economic agents and can make their behavior rational, even 
ZKHQLWGHDOVZLWKDJHQWVVXIIHULQJVHULRXVFRJQLWLYHUHVWULFWLRQVDQGRUODFNLQJVHOIFRQWURO
7KHDYDLODEOHGDWDFRQ¿UPWKDWWKHDFFXPXODWLRQRIH[SHULHQFHXVHRIVWURQJHULQFHQWLYHV
access to various corrective mechanisms and exposure to the discipline of market competi-
tion reduces the frequency of behavioral errors quite sharply (see, for example: Levitt and 
/LVW
$OORIWKHIRUHJRLQJGLVFXVVLRQVKDYHSURFHHGHGIURPWKHLPSOLFLWDVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKH
‘new’ paternalism offers a normative standard that allows for the consequences of certain 
behavioral errors to be assessed, both in relation to an individual and to the whole society. Let 
XVUHFDOOWKDWLWLVDERXWWKHSUHIHUHQFHVUHÀHFWLQJWKHµWUXH¶LQWHUHVWVRISHRSOH+RZHYHUZKHQ
dealing with this fundamentally important issue, the ‘new’ paternalism appears to be impotent.
On the one hand, it claims to seek to improve the life of people based on their own pre-
ferences and asserts that the state knows what these ‘true’ preferences are better than the 
people themselves. On the other hand, it professes that individuals do not have any structu-
UHGSUHIHUHQFHVHYHQIRUPDOO\DVHYLGHQFHGE\WKHLQFRKHUHQFHRIWKHSHRSOHV¶FKRLFHV$V
a matter of fact, according to behavioral economics, any person simultaneously has several 
mutually exclusive sets of preferences.
7KLVSRVHVWKHTXHVWLRQFDQDQ\RIWKHVHVHWVEHUHFRJQL]HGDVµWUXH¶WKDWLVUHÀHFWLQJ
a person’s real interests) and, if yes, which one? Whether the behaviorist normative approach 
makes any sense at all depends upon the answer to this question. Indeed, if people do not 
have any ‘true’ preferences, then it becomes impossible to improve their lives according to 
such non-existing preferences!
It is here that behavioral economics demonstrates its evident conceptual arbitrariness. It 
offers no criteria for determining one set of preferences as ‘true’ and another as ‘false.’ If 
a coherence of preferences is the only condition for ensuring behavioral rationality, it can 
be achieved in many ways by picking certain consistent sub-sets out of all preferences and 
SXWWLQJRIIDOORWKHUV:KLFKRIWKHHOHPHQWVRIWKLVWRWDOLW\VKRXOGWKHQEHVDFUL¿FHGDVQRW
UHÀHFWLQJDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VµWUXH¶LQWHUHVWV"
For example, in terms of hyperbolic discounting, coherence of preferences can be achieved 
either by reducing the short-term preference time rate to a long-term rate level (which beha-
viorists advocate) or by increasing the long-term rate to the short-term rate level. In cases 
ZKHUHDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VEHKDYLRULVVWURQJO\LQÀXHQFHGE\WKHHPRWLRQDOEDFNJURXQGFRKHU-
ence can be achieved by blocking decisions made in a ‘hot’ psychological state (the point 
insisted on by behaviorists) as well as decisions made in a ‘cold’ state. In the case of old-age 
savings, such coherence can be achieved by introducing the ‘default’ option of automatically 
including employees in retirement savings plans (as behaviorists demand) or not including 
WKHP$Q\RIWKHVHZD\VWRKDUPRQL]HSUHIHUHQFHVLVDVJRRGDVWKHRWKHUV6RLQZKDWGLUHF-
WLRQVKRXOG LQGLYLGXDOVEHµQXGJHG¶",Q WKHDEVHQFHRIFOHDUO\GH¿QHGFULWHULDZHFDQQRW
answer this question.
When behaviorists discern the true character of a person in his economical and not extra-
YDJDQWVHOILQKLVSDWLHQWDQGQRWLPSDWLHQWVHOILQKLVUHDVRQDEOHDQGQRWLPSXOVLYHVHOILQ
his ‘cold’ and not ‘hot’ self, etc., they do it in an arbitrary manner, proceeding solely from 
WKHLURZQVXEMHFWLYHOLNHVDQGGLVOLNHV$VDUHVXOWWKHµQHZ¶SDWHUQDOLVPZKLFKSURPLVHG
WRUHVSHFWWKHSUHIHUHQFHVRILWVµSDWHUQDOL]HG¶LQGLYLGXDOVHPHUJHVLQWRWKHFODVVLFDOµROG
fashioned’ paternalism forcing its ‘patron’s’ attitudes and values on individuals.
%\SURFODLPLQJ WKHHQGRJHQHLW\RISUHIHUHQFHVDVDGHFLVLYHDUJXPHQWDJDLQVW WUDGL-
tional welfare economics, the behaviorist approach, in fact, shakes its normative foundation. 
But, in this way, it destroys this foundation also for itself as the idea that individuals have 
DFHUWDLQVXEVHWRIµWUXH¶SUHIHUHQFHVDSSHDUVWREHOHIWKDQJLQJLQWKHEUHH]H:KDWDUHWKH
possible ways of breaking this deadlock?
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It would seem that one of them is empirical. If it were possible to demonstrate that agents 
with rational (coherent) preferences are much more successful and prosper more than agents 
with irrational (incoherent) preferences, it could serve as a criterion for determining ‘true’ 
SUHIHUHQFHVE\FOHDULQJWKHPIURPYDULRXVEHKDYLRUDOHUURUV+RZHYHUEHKDYLRULVWVDUHQRW
willing to take this path. This reluctance may be related to the fact that there are practically 
no data suggesting that individuals, whose behaviors are based on the canons of the ratio-
nal choice model, are more successful than individuals with noticeable behavioral devia-
WLRQV IURP VXFK FDQRQLFDO EHKDYLRUV µ1R VWXGLHVZH DUH DZDUH RI REVHUYH$ %HUJ DQG
**LJHUHQ]HUVKRZWKDWWKRVHGHYLDWLQJIURPUDWLRQDOFKRLFHHDUQOHVVPRQH\OLYHVKRUWHU
OLYHVRUDUHOHVVKDSS\¶%HUJDQG*LJHUHQ]HU3
$GKHUHQWVRIEHKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLFVSUHIHUDK\SRWKHWLFDODSSURDFKWRWKHHPSLULFDORQH
The hypothetical approach involves reconstructing ‘true’ preferences with the help of an as-if 
H[SHULPHQW$VZHKDYHDOUHDG\PHQWLRQHGLQUHIHUHQFHWR6XQVWHLQDQG7KDOHUVHHDERYH
this approach suggests that replacing the factual preferences of individuals with the counter-
factual preferences that would be demonstrated by individuals in ideal informational and 
cognitive conditions. The essence of such a reconstruction is best explained in the words of 
-+DUVDQ\Lµ$SHUVRQ¶VWUXHSUHIHUHQFHVDUHWKHSUHIHUHQFHVKHZRXOGKDYHLIKHKDGDOOWKH
relevant factual information, always reasoned with the greatest possible care, and were in 
DVWDWHRIPLQGPRVWFRQGXFLYHWRUDWLRQDOFKRLFH¶+DUVDQ\L3
Then, ‘true’ preferences are preferences that would emerge in an individual’s choices if 
the individual were an unboundedly rational being, i.e., had perfect information, unlimited 
FRJQLWLYH FDSDELOLWLHV DQG DEVROXWHZLOO SRZHU+RZHYHU WKLV LV DUDWKHU VWUDQJH VROXWLRQ
In fact, it suggests replacing ordinary people with some supernatural beings that cannot be 
found in real life.
First, strictly speaking, it is outside human knowledge to know what preferences such 
hyper-rational agents would have. One can only make more or less plausible speculations 
DERXW LW *UQH<DQRII6HFRQG LW LVQRWFOHDUZK\ WKHSUHIHUHQFHVRIVXFKDJHQWV
should be completely coherent - as, just like ordinary people, they could be subject to status-
TXRELDV0F4XLOOLQDQG6XJGHQ7KLUG WKHYHU\QRWLRQRIµFRPSOHWH LQIRUPDWLRQ¶
FDQQRW EH UHJDUGHG DV XQDPELJXRXVO\ GH¿QHG ,WV LQWHUSUHWDWLRQGHSHQGV XSRQ WKH REMHF-
WLYHVVHWE\DQLQGLYLGXDOKLVFDSDELOLWLHVDQGRQWKHFRQWH[WLQZKLFKKHDFWV0F4XLOOLQ
and Sugden, 2012). Fourth, endowing an individual with complete information, unlimited 
cognitive capabilities and absolute will power would change his personality so much that he 
would, in fact, be a totally different person. Can there be any respect for individual prefer-
ences in this case?
’New’ paternalism is based on an overly ambitious and clearly unrealistic view of human 
QDWXUH QR DFWXDO SHUVRQ FDQ FRPSO\ZLWK LW E\ GH¿QLWLRQ7KLV FOHDUO\ VKRZV WKDW LQ LWV
normative constructions, behavioral economics applies to principles of human behavior that 
are external to it, which runs contrary to its promise to judge welfare based exclusively on 
a  person’s own aims and aspirations: ‘the consequence of dividing the self has been to under-
mine the very idea of true preferences. If true preferences don’t exist, the libertarian pater-
QDOLVWFDQQRWKHOSSHRSOHJHWZKDWWKH\WUXO\ZDQW+HFDQRQO\PDNHOLNHDQROGIDVKLRQHG
SDWHUQDOLVWDQGJLYHSHRSOHZKDWWKH\VKRXOGZDQW¶/HRQDUG3
Because the notions of the hypothetical preferences of imaginary hyper-rational beings 
SURSRVHGE\µQHZ¶SDWHUQDOLVPDGYRFDWHVDVDQRUPDWLYHLGHDOLQHYLWDEO\UHPDLQKD]\DQG
YDJXHWKHUHVXOWLQJYRLGLV¿OOHGZLWKTXLWHVSHFL¿FQRWLRQVKHOGE\YDULRXVJURXSVRIDJHQWV
These may be the preferences of incumbent politicians, or their expert consultants, the public 
PDMRULW\HWF$FORVHUORRNDWZKLFKRIWKHDOWHUQDWLYHVHWVRISUHIHUHQFHVWKHµQHZ¶SDWHUQDO-
LVWVDJUHH WREH µUDWLRQDO¶FOHDUO\ UHYHDOV WKDW WKH\DOZD\V UHÀHFW WKHYDOXHVRI WKHPLGGOH
class, i.e., the social stratum to which the experts themselves belong. They invariably prefer 
economy over extravagance, caution over impulse, calculation over emotions, a healthy life-
style over bad habits, patience over impatience, long-term planning over momentary plea-
 5.DSHOLXVKQLNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
sures, and so on. It can be said that from a sociological point of view, ‘new’ paternalism is 
QRQHRWKHUWKDQDQDWWHPSWWRGLFWDWHPLGGOHFODVVYDOXHVWRVRFLHW\$WWKLVSRLQWWKHGLIIHU-
HQFHVEHWZHHQWKHµQHZ¶DQGWKHWUDGLWLRQDOµROG¶SDWHUQDOLVPDUHSXUHO\QRPLQDO$WWKHHQG
of the day, both try to dictate alien behavioral norms to people against their will.
$VZHKDYHQRWHGWKHPDLQWDUJHWRIWKHEHKDYLRULVWDWWDFNLVWKHRUWKRGR[DSSURDFKRI
ZHOIDUHHFRQRPLFVZLWKLWVQRUPDWLYHVWDQGDUGRIVDWLVI\LQJLQGLYLGXDOSUHIHUHQFHV+RZHYHU
social philosophy and economic theory have an alternative normative tradition that has not 
fallen under the above criticism.
This tradition does not trust ordinary people to make the best decisions all of the time. It 
only argues that we do not know who could make better decisions than people themselves 
DQGWKDWSROLWLFLDQVRI¿FLDOVDQGH[SHUWVDUHDOPRVWVXUHWRGRDZRUVHMRE,WGRHVQRWSRV-
tulate that people are infallible hyper-rational beings. On the contrary, they are viewed as 
boundedly rational and boundedly ethical, shortsighted, weak-willed beings prone to tempta-
WLRQ$VIRUWKHµFRQVXPHUVRYHUHLJQW\¶SULQFLSOHLWLVGHIHQGHGQRWEHFDXVHµWKHFRQVXPHULV
always right,’ but because it holds freedom of choice itself as a high value. It puts a person’s 
right to err among the essential human rights because it is a necessary condition for their 
autonomy, and helps them to become more competent, responsible and independent (in other 
words, more rational).
:HDUHVSHDNLQJDERXWWKHWUDGLWLRQURRWHGLQWKHWHDFKLQJVRI$GDP6PLWKDQGRWKHUSKL-
ORVRSKHUVRIWKH6FRWWLVK(QOLJKWHQPHQWZKLFKFDQEHEURDGO\WHUPHGDVWKHWUDGLWLRQRIFODV-
VLFDOOLEHUDOLVP$FFRUGLQJWR)+D\HNWKLVWUDGLWLRQVHHVDKXPDQµQRWDVDKLJKO\UDWLRQDO
and intelligent but as a very irrational and fallible being, whose individual errors are corrected 
RQO\LQWKHFRXUVHRIDVRFLDOSURFHVV¶+D\HN3,WVRULJLQDWRUVQHYHUYLHZHGKXPDQ
EHKDYLRUDVRSWLPL]LQJµLQWKHLUYLHZPDQZDVE\QDWXUHOD]\DQGLQGROHQW LPSURYLGHQW
and wasteful, and ...it was only by the force of circumstances that he could be made to behave 
HFRQRPLFDOO\RUFDUHIXOO\WRDGMXVWKLVPHDQVWRKLVHQGV¶+D\HN3
While behavioral economics derives paternalist conclusions from bounded rationality, the 
Smithian tradition comes to a directly opposite, anti-paternalistic conclusion. It argues that in 
contemporary, complex societies, the main cognitive load in coordinating economic activity 
LVERUQHE\LQVWLWXWLRQVRIµH[WHQGHGRUGHU¶WHUPFRLQHGE\+D\HNUDWKHUWKDQLQGLYLGXDO
PLQGV%RHWWNHDQG&DFHUHV:HFDQVD\WKDWWKHPDLQSXUSRVHRIWKHVHLQVWLWXWLRQVLV
to prevent and correct the errors made by boundedly rational individuals. If people were fully 
rational beings and possessed unlimited cognitive powers, such institutions would become 
UHGXQGDQW$GKHUHQWVRIWKHEHKDYLRUDODSSURDFKGRQRWUHDOL]HWKDWE\XVLQJSDWHUQDOµFDUH¶
WRUDWLRQDOL]HWKHEHKDYLRURILQGLYLGXDODJHQWVWKH\DUHKDPSHULQJWKHZRUNRIµLQVWLWXWLRQV
of ‘extended order’, complicating economic coordination and rendering the whole process 
OHVVUDWLRQDO$VDUHVXOWWKHPHDVXUHVWKH\SURSRVHWRFXWWKHFRVWVRIEHKDYLRUDOHUURUVPD\
lead to cost increases, and society may begin shifting toward greater irrationality instead of 
moving toward the higher rationality for which they are arguing.
9. Conclusion
%HKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLFVLVDQHZDGYDQFHG¿HOGRIVWXG\WKDWKDVJUHDWO\DOWHUHGPRGHUQ
HFRQRPLFWKHRU\$OWKRXJKWKHPDMRULW\RIIRUPDOPRGHOVXVHGE\HFRQRPLVWVDUHVWLOOEXLOW
RQWKHSHUIHFWUDWLRQDOLW\SULQFLSOHEHKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLFVKDVSUHVHQWHGVLJQL¿FDQWHPSLULFDO
evidence of how far real human behavior deviates from rational assumptions. It made a real 
breakthrough in normative economic analysis, discarding its traditional anti-paternalistic 
attitude.
+RZHYHUFRQWUDU\WR¿UVWLPSUHVVLRQWKHDWWLWXGHVRIEHKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLFVWRZDUGVWKH
conventional rational model of choice turn out to be far from straightforward. Behavioral 
economics rejects it as a descriptive theory but indirectly retain it as a normative ideal, and 
movements toward it are viewed as advancing the ultimate good. Instituting more detailed 
1055.DSHOLXVKQLNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
governmental ‘care’ for society is proclaimed to be the most effective means for achieving 
this goal. From this point of view, the situation with the perfect rationality concept strongly 
resembles situation with another basic idea of neoclassical economic theory — that of perfect 
FRPSHWLWLRQ0RGHUQHFRQRPLVWVDUHDOVRLQFOLQHGWRUHMHFWWKHSHUIHFWFRPSHWLWLRQPRGHODV
an adequate description of economic reality, yet accept it as a normative standard, calling on 
state interventions to be guided by it.
Past experience shows that each new type of ‘market failure’ discovered by economists 
has been followed by an outbreak of state activity. Behavioral economics is not an exception. 
,WKDVLGHQWL¿HGDQXPEHURIEHKDYLRUDOµPDUNHWIDLOXUHV¶SDYLQJWKHZD\IRUDZLGHUDQJH
of paternalistic interventions. Its adherents not only suggested a great number of ingenious 
schemes not previously used in state regulation but also attached intellectual respect to many 
traditional policies that had been used ad hoc, without a clear nod from economic theory.
7KLV WKHRUHWLFDO MXVWL¿FDWLRQZKLOH VDQFWLRQLQJFHUWDLQ W\SHVRI VWDWH LQWHUYHQWLRQ DOVR
PDNHVLWPRUHGLVFLSOLQHGEHFDXVHRWKHUW\SHVRILQWHUYHQWLRQWRZKLFKVXFKMXVWL¿FDWLRQV
turn out to be inapplicable, are beginning to be considered unacceptable. This is how matters 
previously stood with traditional welfare economics. Its theoretical arguments could be used 
successfully to justify various redistribution programs, as well as different measures aimed 
DWRYHUFRPLQJH[WHUQDOHIIHFWV$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKHVDPHDUJXPHQWVSURYLGHGJURXQGVIRU
normative prohibition of paternalistic interventions that directly interfered with individual 
decision-making.
This did not prevent the state from resorting to various paternalistic ‘care’ measures not 
VDQFWLRQHGE\HFRQRPLFWKHRU\+RZHYHUµQRQWKHRUHWLFDO¶IRUPVRIVWDWHLQWHUYHQWLRQKDYH
a different status (i.e., that of inevitable evil or manifestation of the state’s weakness) and 
provide more limited growth potential. It is one thing to raise minimum wages under pres-
sure from trade unions, and quite another to raise them in accordance with the theory of 
PRQRSVRQ\WRLQFUHDVHHPSOR\PHQW,WLVRQHWKLQJWRKDYHLQÀDWHGDEXGJHWGH¿FLWGXULQJ
the pre-Keynesian era, but another to pursue the same policy based on Keynesian arguments 
about the necessity of aggregate demand stimulation. For a long time, the lack of a necessary 
theoretical sanction has been holding back the ‘inherent’ paternalistic ambitions of modern 
JRYHUQPHQWVDQGSUHYHQWLQJWKHPIURPH[SDQGLQJWKHLULQÀXHQFH
The situation changed when behavioral economics provided such a sanction. It demon-
strated that, in matters of their own welfare, people are quite rarely the best judges. This led 
to the conclusion that a paternalistic state might considerably improve the quality of people’s 
decision making. When the ‘inherent’ instincts of the state receive intellectual support from 
the academic community, it is most often a prologue to increased government activity. This, 
as far as one can judge, has happened with the ideas of behavioral economics and the nor-
mative program of ‘new’ paternalism built upon these ideas. In this context, some observers 
identify a growing trend for the welfare state to transform into a paternalistic state with much 
broader opportunities and authority to oversee the activities of individuals.
%HKDYLRUDOHFRQRPLFVKDVFULWLFL]HGWKHRUWKRGR[DSSURDFKRIZHOIDUHHFRQRPLFVGHP-
onstrating the instability of individual preferences and their dependence upon the decision-
making context. Paradoxical as it may be, this type of criticism turned out to be detrimental 
for its own political program. It is undermining the normative basis not only for the traditional 
welfare approach but also for the ‘new’ paternalism, which is proving to be powerless in solv-
ing its most important question regarding ‘true’ individual preferences. In these conditions, 
it would only be natural to turn to an alternative normative tradition in social philosophy and 
economic theory, i.e., a ‘liberal’ one in the broadest sense, built upon the idea of freedom, 
rather than the idea of welfare. It is of utmost importance that, unlike ‘new’ paternalism, in 
WKLVDOWHUQDWLYHWUDGLWLRQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHQDPHVRI+XPH6PLWK0LOO.QLJKW+D\HN
and Coase, the bounded rationality of an individual is not seen as an argument for expand-
ing but rather for limiting state intervention in the economy and, more broadly, in people’s 
private life.
 5.DSHOLXVKQLNRY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFV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